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INTRODUCTION

In 2004, Google Inc. (“Google“) announced to its shareholders
that it would commit approximately one percent of the value of its
1
equity to charitable endeavors. It formed a 501(c)(3) corporate
2
charity, the Google Foundation, to carry out these activities. Subsequently, Google announced that it would not pursue the majority of
its charitable work through its charitable foundation, but instead
3
would act through a for-profit operating division, Google.org. The
federal tax code has granted tax benefits to charitable organizations
4
for almost a hundred years. Generally, an organization must meet
two fundamental requirements to receive these tax benefits. First, it
must be “operated for a good purpose”; and second, it may not dis5
tribute its profits to any private persons. Google decided that it was
worthwhile to forego the charitable tax benefits that may be available
in order to pursue the first requirement (operating for a “good purpose”) without being constrained by the second (refraining from distributing profits). This decision was met with a mixed reaction in the
6
press and in the scholarly community. But at least some scholars re1
Google Inc., Amendment No. 9, Registration Statement (Form S-1), at A-14
(Aug.
18,
2004),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742/ds1a.htm
#toc59330_25a
2
Id.
3
Shruti Rana, From Making Money Without Doing Evil to Doing Good Without
Handouts: The Google.org Experiment in Philanthropy, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 87–88
(2008).
4
Generally, this Article discusses “charitable” organizations, which refers to
those organizations devoted to functions that would enable them to meet the purposes requirement of § 501(c)(3) of the federal income tax code. See 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(3) (2006). “Tax benefits” include the exemption of income for charitable
organizations, which was part of the Income Tax Act of 1913, and the deduction for
contributions to charitable organizations, which was enacted in 1917. Revenue Act
of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.);
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 71–77 (2006)).
5
See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA.
TAX REV. 1, 12–13 (2011) (“The two core statutory requirements of the 1913 exemption are unchanged: charitable exemption still (of course) requires a ‘good’ purpose
(and in general statutory law does not attempt to quantify the purpose); and the exemption still is conditioned on the private inurement restriction.”). Since 1913 a
host of additional restrictions have been placed on charitable organizations, but these two remain fundamental to all charities. See, e.g., id. at 11–13.
6
See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Urban Entrepreneurship and the Promise of For-Profit Philanthropy, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 100 (2007); Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google’s
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acted favorably, arguing that the restrictions imposed on charities
under current law—most fundamentally the so-called “nondistribution constraint,” which is what makes a charity “nonprofit”—
7
unnecessarily impede charitable work.
The most dramatic proposal came from Anup Malani and Eric
Posner, who argued that current law should be changed. Instead of
requiring charities to assume a nonprofit form as a precondition of
receiving tax benefits, such tax benefits should be available to for8
profit firms if they operate for a “charitable” purpose. Malani and
Posner asked: If a for-profit operating division of a for-profit corporation could do the very same good works that a nonprofit charity
could do—in Google’s case develop products that promote worldwide health and energy sustainability—then what is the justification
9
for denying tax benefits to it? Absent a compelling justification for
“coupling” tax benefits with the non-distribution constraint, should
10
not the two things be “de-coupled”? Malani and Posner examine
what they identify as the leading justifications for tax subsidies in the
charitable sector and argue that none of them successfully justifies reserving such benefits exclusively for nonprofit charities, denying
11
them to so-called for-profit charities.
Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at A6; Jennifer Lee, A Charity with an
Unusual Interest in the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at F1. Among other
things, once Google has chosen to forego tax-exempt status, there is arguably nothing in the law to keep it to its promise to devote its funds to a “good purpose.”
7
See, e.g., Christopher Lim, Google.org, For Profit Charitable Entity: Another Smart
Decision by Google, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 28 (2007); Rana, supra note 3, at 93; Dana
Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2454 (2009).
8
Anup Malani & Eric Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017,
2065 (2007); see also M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and
the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 607 (2009) (“[T]he government
should eliminate tax discrimination between producers of altruism.”). More than a
decade before Malani and Posner’s article appeared, Evelyn Brody ominously proposed that, “unless nonprofits can more sharply distinguish themselves from forprofits . . . society might prefer to subsidize charitable and other social outputs produced by all organizations rather than subsidize nonprofits based on their organizational form.” Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Form, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 461 (1996).
9
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2031.
10
Id. at 2029.
11
Id. at 2029–56. The federal tax benefit that this Article focuses on is the deductibility of contributions, and therefore consideration of exemption from the corporate tax is beyond the scope of this Article. Malani and Posner argue that contributors to for-profit firms that do “good work” should be permitted to deduct their
contributions. Id. at 2029. But instances of contributions to for-profit firms doing
charitable work are relatively rare (though not unheard of). Malani and Posner propose that, in addition to a deduction for “pure” contributions, a purchase of a consumer good from a firm that does good deeds should result in a partial deduction to
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It is not just Google that has questioned whether the nonprofit
form is the best way to structure firms that purport to promote the
common good. In just the last few years, a growing number of states
have enacted legislation to enable “hybrid” entities to be created: for12
profit firms devoted to more than just a financial bottom line. These hybrid legal forms are justified at least partially as a response to the
overly restrictive nature of nonprofit law generally, and the “non13
distribution constraint” particularly. So far, none of these states has
enacted tax benefits for the new hybrid entities, but it is likely that tax
14
benefits are not far off.
Malani and Posner’s article provides a potential justification for
future reformers’ intent to re-fashion laws restricting the ability of
charitable organizations to take a profit. While several commentators
15
have criticized Malani and Posner’s article on various grounds, none
has systematically offered a counter-theory explaining why the “cou-

the extent that the purchase price exceeds the “quality adjusted price” of goods with
no charity component. See id. at 2063. These purchases of “good works” goods are
presumably more common than outright donations to for-profit firms, but they implicate valuation issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.
12
To date, eight states have passed legislation permitting the creation of a “lowprofit limited liability company” (“L3C”): Michigan, Vermont, Illinois, Wyoming,
Utah, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Maine. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1611 (2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 450.4102 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-2c-412 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-102 (West 2010). Legislation permitting the creation of so-called “benefit corporations” has passed in seven states:
California, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Virginia. State by
State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/stateby-state-legislative-status (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). Similar legislation is pending in
eight others: Colorado, Louisiana, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Washington D.C. Id. In addition, California has enacted the
“flexible purpose corporation.” See S.B. 201, 2011—2012 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ca. 2012). For an overview of hybrid social-enterprise legal forms, see Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009).
13
See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma,
35 VT. L. REV. 105, 106 (2010) (explaining that “blended” legal forms have arisen
partially because traditional charities are prevented from distributing their profits to
shareholders).
14
Philadelphia has recently become the first jurisdiction in the country to enact a
tax benefit for “benefit corporations,” even though Pennsylvania has not yet enacted
a statute permitting their creation. See PHILADELPHIA., PA., BUSINESS PRIVILEGE TAXES,
PHILA. CODE 19-2600 (2009).
15
See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Response: Keeping Republicans Republican, 88 TEX. L. REV.
235 (2010); see also Victor Fleischer, “For-Profit Charity”: Not Quite Ready for Prime Time,
93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 231 (2008); Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1213 (2010); Mitchell A. Kane, Decoupling?, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 235 (2008); David
M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private
Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 254–55 (2009).
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pling” of the charitable deduction with the non-distribution constraint is good policy. This Article attempts just that. In doing so, it
16
focuses on the so-called “agency theory.” Malani and Posner argue
that the “agency theory” fails to justify reserving tax benefits for non17
profits. Because it is focused on the donor’s choice of charitable
provider, the traditional “agency theory” supports a legal regime that
18
does not discriminate between nonprofit and for-profit charities.
This Article attempts to expand the “agency theory” for the first
time in such a way as to explain why it is reasonable for the government to require that tax benefits be provided only to nonprofit firms
that provide charitable services. Even if meeting its objectives as “efficiently” as possible is the only concern of the government, it is justified in providing tax benefits only to nonprofit providers of charity.
In their article, Malani and Posner imagine a transaction between
someone who provides money to support charitable activities (a donor) and someone who provides the labor and expertise (an entre-

16

Posner and Malani use the term “agency theory” to describe a theory advanced
by Henry Hansmann, with respect to nonprofit organizations, in a series of works in
the early 1980s. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE
L.J. 835 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Role]; Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming].
Other works also discuss the application of the “agency theory” to nonprofit organizations. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 8; Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-forprofit Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99 (2001); Robert A. Katz, Can Principal-Agent
Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts and Organizations?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1 (2000);
Geoffrey Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L.
REV. 227 (1999). See generally THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN
STRUCTURE AND POLICY (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986)(discussing economic analysis of nonprofit organizations, including the agency theory).
17
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2034–41. I use the term “agency theory,” and
the related terms “agent” and “principal” cautiously. The theory called “agency theory” in Malani and Posner’s article is really a theory about transaction costs, not
agency costs because the costs incurred are those between two actors who do not legally enter into an agency relationship. The gist of the argument, however, is essentially the same as the reasoning that underscored Ronald Coase’s seminal work, The
Nature of the Firm—that transaction costs are sometimes high enough to drive rational
market participants to create relationships unlike those that would be created by participants in classical theoretical markets (with low transaction costs). Ronald Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
18
Hansmann’s purported justification for the tax exemption has generally been
called the “capital access theory,” which does link the justification for tax benefits to
the non-distribution constraint. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting
Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 75 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Rationale]. Rather than address Malani and Posner’s critiques of
the capital access theory, this Article provides an alternative justification for linking
tax benefits to the non-distribution constraint—one that is derived directly from the
agency theory. See infra Part III.
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19

preneur). They conclude that there may be many circumstances in
which a donor and an entrepreneur agree that the best way for them
to structure their transaction for the provision of charitable goods
20
would be for the entrepreneur to pay herself a “for-profit” wage.
This Article explores in greater detail the concerns of these characters in the imagined transaction, and it finds that the situations in
which it would be rational for these two characters to structure the
provision of charitable goods in a for-profit form are likely rare. It
then introduces a third character—the government—who seeks to
subsidize the charitable activities provided by the donor and entrepreneur. The original contribution of this Article is that the current
law—in which tax deductions are permitted to contributors to nonprofit firms conducting charitable activities but not to firms conducting for-profit charitable activities—is a rational response of the government to its own role in the transaction based on its evaluation of
21
its own “agency costs.”
I should be clear: this Article is not a criticism of Google’s choice
to pursue its social agenda through a for-profit subsidiary. It is not a
critique of recent “hybrid” legislation, such as benefit corporations or
low-profit limited liability companies. There is nothing in this Article
that questions whether for-profit entities should seek to advance the
social good (they should), or whether the law should be made to accommodate these businesses (it should). Nor is there any critique of
nonprofit charities seeking to expand their funding base to include
revenue-generating businesses or to derive revenue from pursuing
their social mission. The only question raised in this Article is whether the government is justified in providing tax benefits, specifically
the deductibility of charitable contributions, only to nonprofit charities—those bound by the so-called non-distribution constraint. At the
heart of this question is whether it is proper for the government to
withhold tax benefits from organizations that compensate their man22
agement with a so-called “profits” interest in the firm. I argue that it
is.
19

Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2027.
Id. at 2038.
21
Hansmann’s justification focuses on charities’ exemption from federal corporate
income tax, while this Article focuses on the deduction provided to donors to
501(c)(3) charities. See Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 18, at 55–56 (explaining the
focus on the exemption rather than the deduction).
22
The “non-distribution constraint” prevents nonprofit organizations from using
a “profits interest” in two ways: (1) to compensate management for its labor and (2)
to compensate providers of capital for their investment. See Hansmann, Role, supra
note 16 at 838. This Article discusses only the first restriction while leaving for an20
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This Article is divided into three parts. Part II introduces the
“agency theory” and critiques Malani and Posner’s discussion of it. It
finds that the agency theory predicts that donors and entrepreneurs
will generally choose to structure their transactions through a nonprofit firm when the quality of the services they are seeking (the output of the transaction) is hard to measure or hard for the donor to
observe. Malani and Posner propose that a “for-profit” compensation
23
model may be preferable to the parties under certain circumstances,
but their analysis depends on their choice of a hypothetical in which
the “for-profit” model actually replicates the benefits of the nondistribution constraint. Once the hypothetical is more fully explored,
it becomes clear that donors who chose not to avail themselves either
of the nonprofit form or some contractual substitute that replicates
the effects of the non-distribution constraint would likely be creating
a deeply inefficient transaction. This Part of the Article corrects
Malani and Posner’s discussion of the agency theory but does not explain why tax benefits should be legally “coupled” with the nondistribution constraint; it does not explain why donors to charitable
for-profit firms should be denied a tax deduction.
Part III introduces the third character to the “agency-cost” analysis: the government. Because the government is providing a subsidy
to the organization that provides “charitable” services, it is not only a
regulator of providers of charity but also a market participant.
Therefore, it has its own agency costs that are implicated in the transaction. This agency-cost analysis of the government’s interest in
providing tax subsidies appears to be novel in the literature. Prior
work, including Malani and Posner’s, has assumed that the government’s interest is in facilitating the donor’s and entrepreneur’s inter24
ests in the transaction. To the contrary, I argue that the government has its own interest: the provision of charitable goods. While
this interest is often closely aligned with those of donors, it may sometimes conflict with the interests of both donors and entrepreneurs.
In this Part, I generally propose that when the government wants to
provide services under conditions in which the quality of these services is hard to measure or hard to observe, it acts reasonably when it
provides tax subsidies only for those providers who are subject to the
non-distribution constraint. Furthermore, the government is rational
when it chooses to provide tax benefits only to organizations that
other day a full discussion of whether the prohibition a “profits” interest for investors
is similarly justified by the “agency theory.”
23
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2035–37.
24
See, e.g., id. at 2033–34.
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agree to abide by a standardized set of rules relating to the nondistribution constraint. Since it is the government that has to monitor and enforce the constraint, it is obvious why it needs standardized
rules rather than a plenitude of individually contracted agreements.
The final Part of the Article explores current law. Malani and
Posner appear to be misinformed about what types of compensation
are permitted under the law of nonprofit organizations. They categorize the possibilities as (i) a “profits” interest—not permitted to
nonprofit organizations, and (ii) “fixed” compensation—required for
25
nonprofit organizations. In fact, there is a third option, (iii) “incentive-based” compensation. The current law of incentive-based compensation mostly permits nonprofits to solve, as best as possible, the
concerns Malani and Posner have raised about the restricting effect
of the non-distribution constraint on the compensation of charity entrepreneurs. Specifically, under current law, incentive-based compensation is permitted if some method of quantifying a particular
output—other than “net profits”—is possible. The agency theory, as
formulated in this Article, explains why current law draws the line between permissible and impermissible compensation arrangements in
the proper place permitting certain incentive-pay arrangements because they are potentially efficient and prohibiting a pure profitsbased arrangement because it is inefficient. The agency theory also
suggests how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and legal reformers
should be guided in further development of the law of charity management compensation.
II. THE AGENCY THEORY
Malani and Posner’s central argument is that a for-profit organization generally operates more efficiently than a nonprofit organiza26
tion. The proposed reason that it operates more efficiently is that
the opportunity to obtain profits incentivizes the people in control of
the organization to increase their profits by providing whatever goods
27
they provide more cheaply. To the degree to which those in control
of an organization can cut costs while still providing sufficiently highquality goods, such cost-cutting increases the efficient production of
28
those goods. These efficiency gains can be split between the organi-

25
26
27
28

Id. at 2018–19.
Id. at 2055.
Id. at 2027–29.
Id.
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zation and its customers, making everyone happier. Thus, the general rule is that financial incentives, like the ability to keep profits,
encourage those in control of an organization to operate it efficiently
to everyone’s benefit.
Malani and Posner argue that this general rule holds for chari29
table organizations just the same as for other organizations. If the
owners of Starbucks are encouraged to provide a great cup of coffee
in a cost-efficient manner by their ability to get rich from doing so,
then why should the same incentives not improve the ability of an organization that seeks to improve the health of African children? Why
not let providers of charitable goods keep their profits just like providers of regular consumer goods?
The leading answer to that question for the past thirty years has
30
been Henry Hansmann’s theory of “contract failure,” which Malani
31
and Posner refer to generally as the “agency theory.” The agency
theory purports to explain why prohibiting the providers of charitable
goods from personally keeping their profits will generally result in a
32
more efficient structure than permitting them to keep them. This is
generally because it is very difficult or impossible for the people who
pay for charitable goods to ascertain their quality, and so, the providers of such goods will be encouraged to increase their profits by re33
ducing quality. Therefore, to prevent providers of charity from increasing profits by reducing quality, funders of charity generally do
34
not permit providers to take a profit. In other words, the nonprofit
form is usually the best way to assure the most efficient production of
quality goods since it removes the incentive to decrease quality.
Malani and Posner are not primarily interested in whether the
nonprofit form will usually result in a more efficient production of
charitable goods. Rather, they argue that the people who pay for
such charitable goods should be allowed to decide whether a forprofit or nonprofit structure would be best without interference from
35
the government. If there could ever be a situation in which the forprofit provider could provide charitable goods more efficiently, then
it should not be prohibited from doing so. The fact that the government only provides tax benefits to nonprofit organizations that pro29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2063.
Id. at 2035 n.33.
Id. at 2031.
Id. at 2031–33.
See id. at 2033–34.
See id.
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2037.
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vide charitable benefits puts the government’s thumb on the scale
and, in effect, discriminates against for-profit providers, even if those
providers might sometimes provide charitable goods more efficiently.
Part III of this Article addresses why the government is justified
in reserving tax benefits for nonprofit charitable providers only. It
does so by expanding the agency theory to include the concerns of
the government. But before the theory can be so expanded, it must
be presented. This Part presents the agency theory as applied to the
two primary participants in a transaction for charitable goods—the
donor (who provides the money for the charitable goods) and the
entrepreneur (who provides the labor and expertise for the production of those same goods).
A. Henry Hansmann’s Theory of “Contract Failure”
1.

Introduction to Hansmann’s Theory

The term “agency theory,” as used by Malani and Posner, refers
to an explanation for the existence of the nonprofit form of organization generally associated with the work of Henry Hansmann from the
36
early 1980s. Hansmann argued that under certain circumstances,
which he called “contract failure,” purchasers of certain services
would prefer to purchase those services from suppliers who agreed
upfront to pay themselves only a reasonable wage and to devote any
37
surplus value in the firm to advancing the mission of the firm.
Hansmann called this promise the “non-distribution constraint,” and
38
he considered it the defining characteristic of a nonprofit firm.
Hansmann called the purchasers of services in this context “pa39
trons.”
Hansmann identified three situations in which “contract failure”
40
was likely to occur, resulting in the creation of nonprofit firms.
First, nonprofits arise when patrons purchase services to be used by
36
See Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 843–45. Of course, there is also a historical explanation for the development of nonprofit law. But I do not see historical explanations and functional ones as inherently at odds since each may simply explain
the same phenomenon from a different perspective. The functional explanation
serves as a more principled guide when considering proposed changes to existing
policy.
37
See id.
38
See id. at 838.
39
See id. at 841.
40
Although Hansmann’s theory is developed primarily in The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, it is also discussed in other works. For an especially concise description of the
three situations in which nonprofit firms are likely to arise, see Henry Hansmann,
Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 301–02 (1988).
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41

unknown third parties. His prime example of this type of transaction was CARE, an organization that solicits donations and uses the
42
funds to provide relief to poor people in poor nations. Hansmann
called the providers of third-party services “donative” because the patron’s payments are made voluntarily without any expectation of material quid pro quo, that is, in the form of a “donation” or “contribu43
tion.”
Second, “contract failure” may arise when patrons purchase socalled “public goods”— goods that exhibit the characteristics of being
44
“nonrivalrous” and “nonexcludible.” A good is “nonrivalrous” when
“it costs no more to provide the good to many persons than it does to
45
provide it to one person.” It is “nonexcludible” if “once the good
has been provided to one person[, then] there is no way to prevent
46
others from consuming it as well.” Hansmann’s example of this type
of organization is listener-supported (or public) radio, because (i) it
costs the same to broadcast over public airwaves to a single user or to
multiple users, and (ii) it is impossible to restrict access to the transmission once it has been broadcast, so anyone who owns a radio can
47
“free-ride” by listening to the shows without paying. Nonprofits that

41

See Hansmann, Role, supra, note 16, at 846–48.
According to its website, CARE is one of the largest private international humanitarian organizations in the world, providing relief to the poorest communities.
About Care, CARE, http://www.care.org/about/index.asp (last visited May 25, 2012).
CARE provides relief in emergencies, but also attempts to build capacity in poor
communities to fight poverty. See id. Hansmann describes CARE and similar organizations as primarily providing “relief to the poor and distressed.” Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 505. For example, he describes CARE as providing “dried milk
for hungry children in Africa.” Id.
43
See Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 840.
44
See id. at 848.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See id. at 849–51. Of course, Hansmann concedes that, while radio stations fit
the definition of public goods with respect to their listeners, access to their listeners
is potentially a private good. See id. at 850. Commercial radio and television operate
by selling access to its listeners or viewers to advertisers, for whom this access is subject to rivalry (because each minute of additional ad time has costs) and is excludible
(because ad time can be provided to one advertiser without another advertiser having access to it). In addition, it has been pointed out that technology now makes it
relatively easy to turn access to radio or television into a private good because cable
television is so established and satellite radio is becoming more and more widespread. See, e.g., Mark Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1393, 1444 (1988). Thus, in point of fact, public radio is a distinctly problematic example of a public good, although a case may be made that public radio is
different from commercial radio in ways that make its support by advertisers or by
cable or satellite providers sub-optimal.
42
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provide public goods are also “donative” because the inability to prevent free riding again means that provision of the good cannot be
48
conditioned on payment.
Finally, contract failure may arise when patrons purchase certain
services for their own use, if the quality of those services is especially
49
difficult to evaluate. Hansmann’s examples of this type of nonprofit
include organizations that provide healthcare, daycare, or nursing50
home services. He called these nonprofits “commercial” because
their patrons paid for services in a transaction in which a specific
51
good or service was provided in exchange for a set price.
Hansmann was interested in all three types of contract failure because he wanted to explain why nonprofits arise, and therefore, his
52
theory needed to encompass as many types of nonprofits as possible.
In this Article, however, I am most interested in the first and second type of contract failure: the ones that produce donative nonprofits. The reason for limiting my discussion is simple: the type of contract failure that occurs in a donative context is different in kind from
the type of contract failure that occurs in a commercial context, and
the distinctive nature of the donative context demands separate analysis. Because of this limitation, my thesis has to be similarly narrowed. I initially described my thesis as arguing that the government
is justified in reserving tax benefits for nonprofit firms. However, this
Article actually only addresses one of the two major tax benefits provided by the federal government—the deduction for contributions to
charities.
In general, the federal government provides two major general
53
tax benefits to nonprofits: the exemption from corporate tax and
the deduction from income tax for contributions to certain charita54
ble nonprofits. The exemption means that nonprofit organizations
that qualify may earn revenue from their operations (fees for services) that escape taxation even when such revenue exceeds expendi-

48

Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 849 (“Thus, economists generally have concluded that the private market is an inefficient means of providing public goods, and
have looked to alternatives such as public financing as a better approach.”).
49
Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 506.
50
See id. at 505–06.
51
See id. at 502.
52
See id. at 504.
53
See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
54
See id. § 170. Contributions to these same organizations may be deducted from
the amount subject to federal estate tax and federal gift tax. See id. §§ 2055(a)(2),
2522(a)(2).
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tures made to earn that revenue in the year at issue. In addition,
they may earn a return on their investments that escapes taxation. If
the nonprofit had not been exempt from the corporate tax, then it
would presumably pay tax on its net income, when such income is
56
positive.
The deduction, on the other hand, applies only to donations to
57
nonprofit charities. Here, the donor gets to reduce his taxable income by the amount of his contribution, subject to certain restrictions, and therefore no benefit is provided unless a donation is
58
made. Most observers consider the deduction a subsidy to the organization because the cost to the donor of making a donation is re59
duced. The federal government provides other more targeted tax
benefits to nonprofits, like favorable postal rates and the ability to is60
sue tax-exempt bonds. And of course, states often provide tax bene61
fits that piggyback on federal classification of a nonprofit. This Article confines itself to providing a justification for the federal incometax deduction and ignores all these other tax benefits, and thus, in tax
parlance, this Article only concerns entities classified under §
501(c)(3) of the Code—the classification that comprises most organ62
izations that are entitled to receive deductible contributions.
In some ways, the limitation of the justification to the deduction
of contributions makes the task easier. As Hansmann has pointed
out, “In the case of services . . . commonly provided by donative nonprofits, the need for a [nonprofit] organization is so obvious that for-

55

See id. § 501.
For a discussion of why the exemption from income sometimes constitutes a
subsidy and sometimes does not, see Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for
Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX. L. REV. 283 (2011). To the degree to which Hansmann’s
work deals with tax subsidies, it has focused on the exemption. See Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 18, at 55.
57
See § 170.
58
See id.
59
See Gergen, supra note 47, at 1403; see also Galle, supra note 15, at 1215; Ilan
Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1057
(2009).
60
See 39 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006) (favorable postal rates); 26 U.S.C. § 145 (2006)
(tax exempt bonds).
61
For a discussion of state tax benefits, see Evelyn Brody, All Charities Are Property
Tax-Exempt, but Some Charities Are More Exempt than Others, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 621
(2010).
62
The deduction is actually provided under § 170 of the Code, but the entity
classification is provided under § 501(c)(3), and so I refer to such organizations as
“501(c)(3) organizations” herein.
56
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63

profit firms are virtually unheard of.” But thinkers like Malani and
Posner have raised the issue of whether the charitable deduction
should be extended to donations to for-profit firms, and it therefore
64
deserves its own treatment.
Hansmann argued that donative nonprofits arise because “either
the nature of the service in question, or the circumstances under
which it is provided, render ordinary contractual devices inadequate
to provide the purchaser of the service with sufficient assurance that
65
the service was in fact performed as desired.” That is, “Because the
patron has no contact with the intended recipients, he or she would
have no simple way of knowing whether the promised service was ever
66
performed, much less performed well.” Because of this “contract
67
failure,” the patron wants to avoid the for-profit business form. If
the providers of the service could keep any profits not spent on
providing the service, then “the owners of the firm would have both
the incentive and the opportunity to provide inadequate service and
68
to divert the money thus saved to themselves.” Thus, in situations of
“contract failure,” “the nonprofit form offers [patrons] the protection of another, broader ‘contract’—namely, the organization’s
commitment, through its nonprofit charter, to devote all of its [net]
income [after reasonable operating expenditures such as for compensation for its employees]—to the services it was formed to pro69
vide.”
63

See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 508; see also Hansmann, Rationale,
supra note 18, at 87 (“Donative nonprofits, almost by definition, typically provide services that are delivered to third parties or are public goods, and that as a consequence are attended by severe contract failure.”). Anecdotes of contributions made
to for-profit entities, however, are often recounted. For example, my wife and I recently made a contribution to our children’s Montessori preschool, which is a forprofit sole proprietorship, as far as I know.
64
As discussed supra note 11, Malani and Posner actually argue that purchasers
of consumer goods from for-profit firms that “refrain[] from profitable activities that
offend moral sensibilities” should be allowed a charitable deduction for the cost of
the consumer goods they purchased “to the extent of [the firms’] charitable activities.” Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2062–63. This argument is made much more
forcefully by Henderson and Malani, who argue that the deductible amount should
be that amount by which the cost of goods with a charitable component exceeds the
cost of goods without a charitable component. Henderson & Malani, supra note 8, at
609–11. This proposal involves valuation issues beyond the scope of this Article.
65
Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 504.
66
Id. at 505.
67
See id.
68
Id. at 505.
69
Id. at 507. Hansmann’s theory is nicely summed up by Susan Rose Ackerman:
“If the quality of output is difficult to measure, and if contracts for future delivery are
difficult to enforce, the nonprofit form may act as a signal assuring people that quali-
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Of course, there is a cost to patrons for choosing the nonprofit
70
form. Namely, “The curtailment of the profit motive that results
from the non-distribution constraint can reduce incentives for cost
71
efficiency . . . .” Thus, there is a balancing of costs: on the one hand
the cost of removing the strong incentives provided by the profit motive; on the other hand, the cost of monitoring and enforcing highquality services, or (in the absence of monitoring) the risk that managers will reduce the quality of services in favor of profits. Hansmann
suggests that “[o]nly when contract failure is relatively severe is it likely that the advantages of nonprofits as fiduciaries will clearly outweigh
these corresponding disadvantages, and thus give the nonprofit firm
72
a net advantage over its for-profit counterpart.”
To the degree to which it makes sense to describe Hansmann’s
contract failure theory as a “formula,” the formula could be expressed as follows: the nonprofit form will be chosen whenever the cost of
monitoring and enforcing a specific level of product quality exceeds the gains
that are expected to accrue from providing the management of the charity with
73
strong incentives to implement cost-saving efficiencies. The agency theory
suggests that patrons calculate these competing costs and rationally
choose the non-distribution constraint in at least some situations in
which the costs of monitoring quality are high.
2.

Contract Failure and Agency Costs

Hansmann’s basic insight is that there are situations in which the
costs associated with acquiring goods in a normal market—the costs
of monitoring and enforcing a quality product—are so great that the
market will not produce the desired services, even if they are in great
74
demand. Malani and Posner call Hansmann’s theory the “agency
theory” because these monitoring and enforcement costs are plausity will not be sacrificed for private monetary gain.” Susan Rose-Ackerman, Introduction, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE & POLICY,
supra note 16, at 3, 5.
70
For acknowledgement of the loss of efficiency-enhancing incentives, see Rob
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 518–19 (1990)
(“Hansmann’s theory . . . assumes arguendo that nonprofit management will overcome the temptations of waste, or worse, at least to the extent that losses from waste
attributable to lack of scrutiny by equity owners do not exceed gains from the reduced incentives to increase distributable income by skimming.”).
71
Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 507.
72
Id.
73
This “formula” does nothing more than summarize Hansmann’s theory that
the nonprofit form is the most efficient form when contract failure makes transaction or agency costs excessively high.
74
See Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 845 (defining “contract failure”).
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75

bly called “agency costs.” The literature on agency costs generally
proposes that whenever one person engages another to perform services on his behalf the parties will incur some “positive monitoring
and bonding costs (nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and
76
those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.”
Generally, it is understood that no compensation structure could
perfectly align the interests of the agent and principal and so some
77
agency costs will always be incurred in an agency relationship. But
what makes one compensation arrangement more efficient than another in any specific situation is how it reduces agency costs specific
to that situation.
Nonprofit organizations have been intriguing to “agency-cost”
thinkers because they pose a notoriously intractable “agency cost”
problem. While “owners” are presumed to make efficient decisions
about how much to expend to monitor their agents in for-profit
firms, nonprofit firms have no owners, and therefore, there is no one

75
It would actually be more accurate to call them “transaction costs” since the
costs described are those associated with ensuring that a quality product is provided
in what may well be a one-off transaction in the marketplace. See supra note 18.
“Agency costs” are more accurately associated with the costs incurred within a firm
when the owners of the residual value in the firm (the principals) employee nonowner workers (the agents) to diligently increase that residual value. See, e.g., Louis
Putterman, Ownership and the Nature of the Firm, 17 J. COMP. ECON. 243, 244 (1993)
(“The . . . separation of ownership and work is the basic cause of the familiar agency
problem between employer and employee.”). Hansmann does not use either term.
In this Article, I have chosen to use the term “agency costs” because it is used to describe the costs involved (monitoring, etc.) consistently in the literature. See, e.g.,
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 635
(2004) (“The agency cost theories of the firm focus on the problems of shirking and
monitoring that stem from information asymmetries within the organization’s component relationships.”). The type of market transaction engaged in between a donor
and an entrepreneur in Malani and Posner’s article could plausibly meet the definition of an “agency relationship,” giving rise to agency costs, at least under a definition provided by Michael Jensen and William Meckling in a seminal article on the
subject: “We define agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the
agent.” Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
76
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 75, at 308. According to Jensen and Meckling,
“monitoring” costs are those incurred by the principal to ensure that his interests are
maximized, and “bonding” costs are those incurred by the agent to assure the principal that the agent is maximizing the principal’s interests. See id. at 308–09. Agency
costs also include the residual loss incurred by the divergence of interests that is not
corrected by expenditures for monitoring or bonding. Id.
77
Sitkoff, supra note 75, at 637.
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who can gain financially from ensuring that agents act efficiently.
From a legal point of view, a board of directors is ultimately responsible for the actions of the organization, but this board of directors itself has no right to residual value in the firm, and no one with such
79
an interest can discipline the board for failing to maximize benefits.
Nor can the board be disciplined by a market for corporate control
since the right to elect board members is either held by the board itself or by “members” whose control rights cannot be sold. This lack
of strong incentives among private parties coupled with restrictive
standing rules is perceived as a perfect storm that creates outrageous
80
inefficiency in nonprofit firms.
While there are no true “principals” in the nonprofit organization from a legal point of view, the non-distribution constraint creates
a sort of theoretical agency relationship between the managers (as
81
agents) and the mission of the nonprofit. Because any residual value in the firm is committed to the mission of the organization, the
managers are in effect working for the ultimate benefit of the mission
since they have fiduciary duties to faithfully pursue the mission.
But, of course, the “mission” of the charity is often somewhat diffuse and undefined, and there is no existing person who can enforce
the management’s fidelity to its best interest—at least no one with a
financial interest in doing so. Even the charitable beneficiaries, who
may sometimes benefit financially from the charity, are too diffuse a

78

See, e.g., Putterman, supra note 75, at 256 (“[W]hereas the existence of a residual claimant and holder of alienation rights is regarded as the best guarantor of efficient resource use where conventional goods are concerned, it is the absence of such
[a person] that is called for [in the nonprofit setting].”).
79
The board can be held legally accountable but not by anyone with a right to
the residual value in the firm. For example, the state attorney general is authorized
to sue in all states. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. a (1959) (“[A]
suit to enforce a charitable trust can be maintained by the Attorney General of the
State in which the charitable trust is to be administered.”) In some states, donors
may sue under certain circumstances, as can others with “special interests” in the organization. See Jonathan Klick & Robert Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and
Corporate Control: Evidence from the Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 818–19
(2008) (“Almost half the states have given Donors standing concurrent with the attorney general to enforce a charitable trust.”).
80
See, e.g., Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 79, at 782 (“The prevailing scholarly view, in
other words, is that agency costs are rampant in charitable trust governance.”) (citing
Richard Posner, Marion Fremont-Smith, Henry Hansmann, Harvey Dale, Evelyn
Brody, Alex Johnson, Dana Brakman Reiser, Ronald Chester, and Susan Gary).
81
Id. at 780 (“[A] charitable trust must be for the benefit of a charitable purpose
. . . not for a specific beneficiary. . . . Hence, for a charitable trust there is no identifiable beneficiary with an economic incentive and legal standing to ensure [that the
charity efficiently pursue its purpose.]”).
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class to adequately enforce the obligations of the charity’s management, even if they were legally permitted to do so.
If the beneficiaries cannot fulfill a monitoring role, then the donors could potentially play the role of “principals” in the agency relationship. To the degree to which they have donated money to the
organization for the purpose of advancing the organization’s charitable mission, it is in their interest to make sure that money is spent
well. The problem is that it is not always entirely clear that the donors’ sole interest is in advancing the organization’s charitable mission. Any divergence of the donors’ interests from those of the charitable mission of the organization means that the donor will not be a
perfect guardian of the true principal’s interest.
Even though the donor is not really the true “principal” in the
nonprofit charitable form, in Hansmann’s theory it is the donor who
must make a decision about how to provide charitable goods, and so
it is the donor who must perform some sort of “agency cost” analysis
to determine whether he would be better served trying to provide
82
those charitable goods through a nonprofit or a for-profit firm.
Hansmann’s theory posits that when donative charities provide charitable goods, it is likely that the “agency costs” involved in monitoring
quality, in bonding, and in losses involved in inadequately monitoring or bonding in a for-profit firm are likely to persuade donors to
make their donations to nonprofit providers.
3.

Donors and the Market for “Altruism”

The insight described above—that donors are not the true
“principals” in a charitable transaction and yet are the ones who
choose which organizations get support—is extremely important.
The idea that socially beneficial goods can be provided through private charities depends on donors having at least some interest in socially beneficial outcomes. If the government seeks to subsidize the
provision of socially beneficial outcomes—charity—then it must be
able to determine when and to what extent it can rely on the choices

82

While I treat the donor as the sole “principal” in Part II of this Article, the central thesis described in Part III is that the donor is not the only principal. When the
government provides tax incentives to donors to make charitable contributions, it too
becomes a principal. The government then must examine its own agency costs. The
American system of subsidizing charities through a generally applicable subsidy for
charitable donations gains much of its strength from the incorporation of this central agency-cost insight: the government can save agency costs in providing charitable
goods if it can identify donors whose interests broadly align with its own. Thus, identifying those donors is the central concern of the law governing the charitable tax
deduction.
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of donors. That is, the government needs to be able to determine
when donors’ interest is in providing charitable goods and when they
have other interests that the government may not share. If that is
true, then some explanation is needed of what donors are doing
83
when they donate money to charities.
Hansmann called the people who provided the money to fund
84
nonprofit organizations, the “patrons.” Patrons are both regular
customers who purchase a good, like medical care, for their own consumption, and “donors,” who purchase a good for the benefit of
85
some unknown third party. But since this Article focuses on donative nonprofits, only donors are of interest. Donors are in some ways
like customers who trade their money for something they want. All
other things being equal, they try to get services of a certain quality at
the cheapest price they can. In other words, they try to maximize
their own utility in the transaction.
The donor who provides charitable goods to benefit a third party is both similar and different. Hansmann’s example of a provider of
third-party services is CARE, an organization that provides relief food
or medical care for poor people in developing countries, especially
86
Africa. When a person contributes money to CARE, he is doing so
87
for the purpose of helping someone else. He wants to help that person. He wants to do good for someone other than himself. In this
88
Article, I will call this act “altruistic.”
83

See, e.g., Henderson and Malani, supra note 8, at 577–78.
See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 502–03. One could imagine other
potential types of suppliers of money to an organization. For example, organizations
often receive money from people who are not “patrons” in either the donative or the
commercial sense. This money is not payment for services; rather it is capital to be
used to build up or expand the business, with the assumption that earnings (from
payments from patrons) will follow in sufficient amounts to justify the expenditure of
the capital. These providers of money should probably be called “investors.” A sustained treatment of investors is beyond the scope of this work.
85
Id. There is also arguably a subclass of donors who purchase so-called “public”
goods both for their own consumption and for the consumption of the general public. For example, a donor to listener-supported radio contributes in order to enjoy
programming that he likes but also to permit others to enjoy the same programming.
He either values the fact that others are “free-riding” on his donation or he is indifferent to it.
86
Id. at 505.
87
Id.
88
Of course, pure altruism may not be the only reason why a person donates to a
donative charity. He may receive some sort of immaterial gain from the transaction.
For example, he may gain the trust or respect of his peers by donating. This trust or
respect may be a good in itself, or it may be useful to the donor in the future in some
transaction with his peers that may result in material gain to him. Even if he donates
anonymously, it is possible to describe the donor’s motivation as a form of benefit to
84
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While it is slightly awkward to do so, I will use the word “altru89
ism” as a good or service sought by donors to a charitable endeavor.
Thus, when a donor contributes money to a charitable enterprise
with no expectation that he will get it back, and no expectation that
he will receive anything of material value in return for it, I will say
that he has purchased some altruism. Thus, in Hansmann’s example
of the African relief organization CARE, the money provided by donors can be explained only if we assume that these donors want to
advance the health of African children—that is, they want some altruism—and they are willing to pay for it. So, donors are similar to “customers” (the other subcategory of patrons) in that they are purchasing something (in this case “altruism”) for themselves. But it is
important to distinguish them from other customers because the nature of the good they are buying—altruism—is different from the na90
ture of what is being bought by other customers.
The reason I care about distinguishing “altruistic” motives from
non-altruistic motives is not because I argue that altruism itself deserves to be rewarded with government largess. Rather, the point is
that when a donor provides altruism to himself, he provides something that benefits the general public. Therefore, the government’s
ability to identify the donor seeking altruism may be the key to the
government’s ability to provide tax benefits in an efficient manner.
Tax benefits to donors seeking altruism advance the government’s inhimself. He donates because it makes him feel good to do so. This motivation has
been called “warm glow.” See Galle, supra note 15, at 1222; see also Henderson &
Malani, supra note 8, at 583 (identifying “warm glow” motivations, distinguishing
them from “pure altruism,” and stating that they use the term “altruism” to describe
a mixture of warm glow and pure altruism). These possible immaterial benefits,
therefore, range on a spectrum from those benefits that are closest to a financial
benefit to those motives that are practically indistinguishable from the genuine desire to assist others. For example, it is hard to discern a precise difference between
donating to the entrepreneur’s efforts to help African children because it makes the
donor feel good and donating out of a genuinely non-self-interested desire to help.
Luckily, for the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to distinguish between
genuine other-directedness and a desire to help someone because it makes one feel
good; it is enough to call both of those things “altruism.” Accepting that “altruism” is
a tricky and controversial concept, I am satisfied with the definition of “weak altruism” provided by Rob Atkinson: “The point to be made here is that, despite unclarity
at the margin, the central concept of weak altruism—a transfer without a quid pro
quo—is not only intelligible, but also operable, as a criterion for drawing distinctions
with important legal consequences.” Atkinson, supra note 70, at 531–32.
89
In this usage, I follow Henderson & Malani, supra note 8, at 573 (“With total
charitable activity . . . totaling nearly one trillion dollars in the United States last year,
the demand for altruism is obvious.”).
90
As Rob Atkinson has pointed out, this situation is unusual, and it is worth emphasizing “the distinctiveness of transactions in which one party confers a benefit on
another without the expectation of material reward.” Atkinson, supra note 70, at 523.
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terest in providing public and third-party goods. Tax benefits to donors seeking non-altruistic goods do not advance the government’s
interests.
B. Malani and Posner’s Application of the Agency Theory
Malani and Posner argue that the charitable deduction should
be provided to donors to any firm that provides charitable goods,
91
whether the firm is a nonprofit or a for-profit. The agency theory
provides an explanation for why purchasers of altruism would, in
most cases, prefer to purchase their altruism from nonprofit firms.
Malani and Posner begin their article with a hypothetical, which
they use to illustrate why a donor and an entrepreneur might choose
92
to structure their donative transaction in a for-profit form. When examined more closely, however, their hypothetical actually illustrates
quite well why—consistent with Hansmann’s prediction—a donor
would almost always choose a nonprofit rather than a for-profit structure for his charitable contribution. The donor would choose a nonprofit to provide altruistic goods because the cost of monitoring the
“product quality” of altruistic goods will almost always exceed the
gains that he may predict could be caused by the incentives provided
by the for-profit form. Malani and Posner’s hypothetical illustrates
this cost-benefit analysis because they craft a sort of private nondistribution constraint to cabin the costs of monitoring product quality, thus illustrating the necessity of a non-distribution constraint to
ensure product quality in most donative charities. The best way to
evaluate this argument is by investigating Malani and Posner’s hypothetical in some detail.
1.

The Non-Distribution Constraint’s Effect on the
Entrepreneur’s Compensation

Malani and Posner ask us to imagine that an entrepreneur
“wants to establish a charity to improve the health of children in de93
veloping countries.”
She will do so by devising ways to provide
94
clean water to previously underserved remote villages in Africa.
Thus, Malani and Posner’s hypothetical is a classic donative-type char-

91
92
93
94

Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2022.
Id. at 2018.
Id.
Id.
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ity and is very similar to Hansmann’s example of a donative organiza95
tion, CARE, which provides food to hungry children.
The donor in Malani and Posner’s hypothetical generally con96
forms to the image of a donor discussed above. It is unclear exactly
why the donor does what he does, but it is certain that he wants to
provide money and in return obtain some benefit for African chil97
dren. He wants to purchase some altruism. But Malani and Posner
are actually more interested in the entrepreneur than the donor in
the transaction.
In Malani and Posner’s hypothetical, the entrepreneur thinks
98
that her activities potentially create altruism. She does not want to
99
provide her own money in exchange for that altruism, though. She
thinks that other people may want to help African children and that
100
they may be willing to provide cash in exchange for it. She wants to
provide her labor (her organizational, managerial, or innovative
skills) to improve children’s health, and she wants to receive at least
101
some money in exchange for it.
Thus, she makes a deal with the
donors: if they give her some cash, she will improve the health of Af95

Compare Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2018, with Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 505.
96
See supra Part II.A.3.
97
Among other things, we know that the donor is not an “investor,” as that term
is described supra note 82. The non-distribution constraint prevents the donor from
receiving any financial return on his contribution. I will assume for the present that
the donor is not the same person as the entrepreneur, even though there is nothing
in current law to prevent the donor from being paid for his labor by the charity, nor
is there anything to prevent the entrepreneur from donating to her own charity.
98
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2032.
99
Id. at 2018 (“Running this charity will require the entrepreneur’s time and effort, for which she would like to be compensated out of the funds that the organizations obtains from donations or revenues from any sales made in developed countries.”)
100
Id.
101
Id. at 2018–19. The question of whether the entrepreneur is also seeking some
“altruism” for herself is one that is central to many treatments of this issue. In other
words, it is possible that the entrepreneur will seek less financial compensation for
providing children’s health because she values doing it for its own sake. To the degree to which donors can perceive the fact that the entrepreneur wants to advance
the same altruistic goals as they do, donors would be very wise to invest their money
with the entrepreneur, since their unanimity of interests has the potential to completely eliminate agency costs, which, after all, arise from the disparate interests of
agents and principals. Some commentators have emphasized the entrepreneurs’ acceptance of low salaries as a signal of their altruism. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 15, at
1225; Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the ‘Contract Failure’ Explanation for Non-Profit Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1997). The problem, of course, is that acceptance of low salary may be a sign not only of the “altruism” of the entrepreneur but also of her incompetence.
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102

rican children.
This is a simple transaction between a provider of
labor (the entrepreneur) and some providers of funds (the donors).
This Article assumes that the entrepreneur wants to maximize her fi103
nancial compensation—she is not seeking any altruism for herself.
Malani and Posner argue that the entrepreneur has the choice
between two basic forms of compensation for her efforts on behalf of
the African children. On the one hand, she can provide herself with
a “fixed” salary, in which case she can create a “nonprofit” firm and
104
employ herself as its director. If she would prefer, however, she can
pay herself with whatever funds are left over after she provides health
to the African children—the “profits” of the firm—in which case she
105
can structure her charity as a “for-profit.”
Malani and Posner ask:
Why should the existence of an income-tax deduction for contributions to nonprofit firms, but not for-profit firms, influence this simple
arrangement between donors and the entrepreneur? Since economic theory suggests that the for-profit model is preferable to many consumers in the provision of goods for themselves, why should we assume ex ante that donors would not prefer to use a for-profit
106
structure in providing health to African children?
Malani and Posner briefly recount the well-accepted reasoning
that supports consumers’ choice of for-profit firms for regular consumer goods. In order to explain the choices of compensation structure available to the donors and the entrepreneur, they ask us to imagine a transaction in which the donors want to provide for the
107
health of African children by supplying them with fresh water.
102

Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2018.
Malani and Posner argue that “[o]ne problem with the agency theory is that it
assumes that only altruistic Entrepreneurs will choose the nonprofit form, and that
nonaltruistic entrepreneurs will always choose the for-profit form.” Id. at 2034. As
discussed herein, the agency theory suggests that non-altruistic entrepreneurs will
choose the nonprofit form when the agency costs of ensuring a quality product exceeds the (predicted) loss of efficiency from removing profit as an incentive for creating efficiency. None of the works cited by Posner and Malani support their claim
that the “agency theory” only explains the choice of the nonprofit form when the entrepreneur is altruistic. See, e.g., Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 16, at 102 () (“Our
basic results . . . do not depend on Entrepreneurial altruism . . . . [But] our model
shows that more altruistic Entrepreneurs would opt for nonprofit status.”).
104
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2018.
105
As discussed infra Part IV, this simple binary description of possible compensation structures does not conform to reality. Instead, it makes more sense to envision
an array of possible compensation structures, with “fixed” at one pole, “profits-based”
at the other, and various types of “incentive-based” structures inhabiting the range of
possibilities between the poles.
106
See Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019.
107
Id. at 2018.
103
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Through the efforts of the entrepreneur, “the charity raises $10 million from donors but manages to develop a water filtration system at a
108
cost of only $8 million.” Now imagine the two possible compensation structures described by Malani and Posner. If the charity is a forprofit, the entrepreneur can take home the two-million-dollar profit.
That is her compensation. If the charity is a nonprofit, then the entrepreneur would only be paid the fixed salary to which she agreed in
109
advance.
There is a compelling reason why donors might want to compensate the entrepreneur using a “profits” interest in the firm. Donors know that the entrepreneur is the one most likely to discover
110
cost-saving mechanisms for providing water to African children. After all, the entrepreneur is the one who is there. She is the one who
presumably knows the most about African children, their needs, and
how best to provide for those needs. If the entrepreneur acts to maximize her financial interests, then providing her with a financial incentive to reduce the costs involved in providing water to African
children is the best way to maximize the chances that such cost-saving
111
efficiencies will be discovered or implemented. Thus, there may be
good reasons to incentivize the entrepreneur’s discovery and imple108
Id. Malani and Posner use ten million dollars and eight million dollars when
they initially introduce their hypothetical, but they later change the amounts to one
hundred dollars and eighty dollars. Id. at 2027.
109
Malani and Posner suggest that the for-profit structure may be better than the
nonprofit because, if the entrepreneur is very talented, she could make a lot of money at a for-profit company and she may not be willing to work at the nonprofit for
such a low salary. Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019. They also suggest that she
might need to provide a “profits” interest in the firm not just to herself, but “to motivate her employees to work hard.” Id. If high quality entrepreneurs prefer the forprofit form, then donors might prefer it as well in order to retain talented managers
or workers. Malani and Posner’s assumption, however, that a nonprofit wage (a
“fixed” salary) is necessarily a low salary is not reflected either conceptually or actually
in the law of nonprofits. There is nothing about the non-distribution constraint, or
in the law of charitable nonprofits, that prevents nonprofit firms from paying an executive what her labor is worth. This subject is discussed more fully infra Part IV. At
least theoretically, if the entrepreneur could be paid a fixed salary of two million dollars at a for-profit firm doing similar work, she could be paid two million dollars to
manage the nonprofit firm. “Thus, nonprofit law does not compel the argument
that the entrepreneur will abandon nonprofit firms because the pay is too low.
110
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2027.
111
As Evelyn Brody has pointed out, “[W]hile the nondistribution constraint
might convince the patron that the nonprofit is more trustworthy than a for-profit in
situations of opportunistic behavior, the nonprofit could be even less trustworthy in
avoiding inefficient expenditures.” Brody, supra note 8, at 464. Atkinson describes
this problem with a reference to equity owners: “Without equity owners looking over
their accounts, if not their shoulders, nonprofit managers lose an important incentive to minimize costs.” Atkinson, supra note 70, at 518.
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mentation of cost-saving methods of providing water.
The proper
question is not how high or low the entrepreneur’s compensation is
but who bears the risk that the costs of providing the service promised
113
will be greater than or less than those expected by the donor. It is
obvious why donors may want the entrepreneur to bear that risk (and
be compensated with the upside potential of being able to provide
114
the agreed-upon goods at a lower-than-expected cost).
But the impediments to the donor compensating the entrepreneur with a profit interest in the transaction are substantial. The
primary impediment to the for-profit structure is the predicted cost
the donor will incur in monitoring the quality of the altruistic goods
provided by the entrepreneur. Remember, with ordinary consumer
goods, like a cup of coffee, the purchaser of the good can evaluate
the quality immediately, simply by taking a sip. He can choose to
never again buy coffee from a provider who has not supplied sufficient quality to justify the price. But in the case of altruistic goods,
the donor does not have immediate access to the information necessary to evaluate the quality of the good supplied. The goal is to provide water to African children. How much water has been provided?
What are comparable costs of providing water from other suppliers?
Has the water been provided in a sustainable way? Is providing water
even the best way to improve the lives of children? Is one’s contribu112

Donors are unlikely to agree that the entrepreneur can take home all of the
savings she provides, but one could imagine an agreement by which they split the
profits in some way. That is, she provides them with a slightly lower cost product and
keeps the remainder as compensation for producing the savings that resulted in the
lower cost to the donors.
113
If the entrepreneur were restricted to a fixed salary, as Malani and Posner argue she is in a nonprofit firm, then she would have to decide ex ante what the split
would be between her salary and the administrative costs. If she could compensate
herself with a “profits” interest, as she can in a for-profit firm, then she could wait
and pay herself whatever is left over after she pays all the administrative costs. Thus,
the difference between a “fixed” salary and a “for-profit” salary is actually one of time
(and therefore it is an allocation of risk). If the entrepreneur chooses a “split” of
administrative costs ex ante, then her compensation is “fixed,” and the donor bears
the risk that other administrative costs will be high; if she waits until actual, other
administrative costs are incurred to determine how much of the total administrative
cost pie she can keep for herself, then she has a “profits” interest and she bears the
risk that other administrative costs will be high. Economic literature on “incomplete
contracts” suggests that when it is impossible for a contract to fully specify potential
outcomes, the allocation of residual control rights is extremely important because it
determines who benefits from an innovation or a changed outcome. See, e.g., Oliver
Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to PublicPrivate Partnerships, 113 ECON. J. C69 (2003).
114
Posner and Malani do not expressly consider the possibility that the entrepreneur could get paid nothing under the for-profit model, although, theoretically, this
should be a possibility.
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tion providing any marginal benefit, or would the benefit be the same
115
without that contribution?
Answering all of these questions has
some cost, and the uncertainty that arises from being unable to answer these questions can also be described as a cost. These costs are
the “agency costs” that give the so-called agency theory its name.
Thus, in the case of altruistic goods, like the one described in
Malani and Posner’s hypothetical, the “agency costs” associated with
assessing and monitoring product quality are substantial. When
agency costs are high, donors may prefer a nonprofit form. Another
way of looking at the issue is that the “agency costs” described are all
related to assessing whether the entrepreneur is providing a quality
116
good, or is, instead, enriching herself by shirking on quality. If it is
too expensive for the donor to ensure himself that the entrepreneur
is not enriching herself by providing low-quality services, then a non117
distribution constraint is a rational choice.

115
The situation can be illustrated as follows: First, imagine a donor paying $100
to an organization that provides $100 worth of food to African children. Obviously,
the donor would be happy with that outcome; there was no payment necessary for
the administrative costs of getting the food to the children. Second, imagine that a
donor pays $100 to an organization, that other donors pay $10,000 to the same organization, and that the organization provides $10,100 worth of food to African
children. Again, the donor got a great deal since all of the money spent provided a
benefit to her intended beneficiaries. Finally, imagine that a donor pays $100 to an
organization to which other donors pay $10,000 but that the organization only provides $100 worth of food to African children (presumably, the $10,000 goes into the
pockets of the managers of the organization). The donor still got $100 worth of food
for African children for her $100 donation, but the managers pocketed the money
provided by everyone else. If this final hypothetical organization does not provide a
“quality good” in exchange for the donations received—if a donor would prefer to
give her money to the first or second organization—then “altruism” is a good such
that its marginal benefit is a material consideration for donors. In order to separate
the benefit attributable to the donor’s payments from the benefits attributable to
everyone else’s donations, it is important whether one donor’s payments can be
identified with some measurable output of benefit’.
116
The counterpoint of the agency costs involved in assessing product quality suggests an alternative formulation of the “formula” proposed above. See supra Part
II.A.1. The assessment of “agency costs” could be expressed in this way: the nonprofit
form will be chosen whenever it is impossible or prohibitively costly for the Patron to distinguish
profits derived from efficiently providing a high-quality product and profits derived from shirking on quality.
117
As Malani and Posner put it: “The nondistribution constraint blunts the incentive of the Entrepreneur to shirk by limiting the return that the Entrepreneur receives from the operation of the firm.” Malani and Posner, supra note 8, at 2033–34.
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Malani and Posner’s Hypothetical Reduces Agency
Costs by Replicating the Non-Distribution Constraint

Malani and Posner solve the “agency cost” problem not by showing how the cost of monitoring product quality could be reduced, but
by creating a hypothetical situation in which the entrepreneur cannot
118
enrich herself by shirking on quality. In other words, they create a
private non-distribution constraint, which solves the agency cost problem in the exact same way the non-distribution constraint is intended
to solve the agency cost problem: by committing a certain amount of
money to be spent on charitable purposes and preventing the entrepreneur from enriching herself by reducing that amount of money.
Malani and Posner illustrate the difference between compensation in
a for-profit firm and a nonprofit firm as follows: they ask us to imagine that the entrepreneur promises the donors that she will use
eighty percent of their donations directly to provide for sick children
119
in Africa. They define a “high quality product” as providing eighty
120
Presumably, that
percent of every dollar donated to the children.
reflects the donor’s best information about what he could obtain
from other providers in the relevant market. One should note that
with respect to the eighty percent provided to children in Africa, the
entrepreneur is not permitted to increase her compensation by
providing services more efficiently. She must use all eighty percent of
the money provided for the benefit of the children, no matter how
much it costs to provide them with water. In other words, she is
bound by the non-distribution constraint!
Thus, without saying so explicitly, Malani and Posner concede
that with respect to the eighty percent provided to the African children, the nonprofit model is preferred. Presumably, this non-distribution
constraint is necessitated by the very agency costs that make the nondistribution constraint so often the most efficient method of providing charitable goods—the cost of identifying what would constitute a
benefit for the African children and monitoring whether an agreedupon benefit has been provided for each dollar donated. But Malani
and Posner do not seem to appreciate that the non-distribution constraint in this part of their organization will have the very same costs
as elsewhere—the entrepreneur has no incentive to provide actual
118

Id. at 2027.
Malani and Posner state that the entrepreneur will “ensure [that eighty percent of the money they donate] reache[d] the hands of the sick children[.]” Id.
They also state that she will “send [eighty percent] of the donation to sick children.”
Id.
120
Id. at 2032.
119
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benefit to the African children efficiently; as long as she spends
eighty percent of the money on something in Africa, she has provided
121
a quality good.
Malani and Posner then ask us to imagine that the remaining
twenty percent has to be split between her personal compensation
122
and “administrative costs.”
These “administrative costs” must be
separated from program costs, and the hypothetical only works if they
can be reduced without harming the donor’s interests. Malani and
Posner suggest that the twenty percent of each donation that can be
used for something other than the direct benefit of the children will
be split between administrative costs and the entrepreneur’s compen123
sation. They argue that the entrepreneur is more likely to find ways
to reduce administrative costs if she is permitted to increase her
124
compensation.
But the reason that this compensation structure
appears to be so attractive depends on the nature of “administrative”
costs. If these costs can be reduced without any reduction in the quality of the goods provided, then there is no reason for the donor to be
concerned with whether they are paid to third parties or kept by the
entrepreneur. Malani and Posner purport to define a quality product
(eighty percent of each contribution goes to Africa) in a way that re125
ducing administrative costs cannot affect it.
If there is no way for the

121
Malani and Posner appear to recognize that contract failure may require some
form of non-distribution constraint to facilitate an efficient transaction, and thus
they propose several methods for using an express non-distribution constraint in
what is otherwise a formally for-profit firm. Id. at 2036. They propose that if the entrepreneur promised to hire a manager to control all expenditures of the firm and
did not allow that manager to profit from cost-saving innovations, the donors may be
assured that the firm would not enrich itself by shirking on quality. Id. It is hard to
see why this solution is better than a traditional nonprofit, because the manager who
controls expenditures has no strong financial incentive to improve the efficiency of
the firm. Second, Malani and Posner propose that “an auditor” could police the
contract, which of course is one way to address monitoring problems, although it has
a cost. Id. Finally, they suggest that the entrepreneur could institute a “cost-plus
pricing scheme” in which the donors rather than the entrepreneur are the residual
beneficiaries so the entrepreneur is paid a fixed salary, but the donors receive a refund at the end of the year if any cost-saving mechanisms are found. Id. at 2036–37.
Again, it is not clear why this form is better than a nonprofit since the entrepreneur
is still paid a fixed salary.
122
Id. at 2027.
123
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2027.
124
Id. at 2027–28.
125
Id. at 2032. In point of fact, it is plausible that administrative costs are relevant
to whether a quality product is provided, if they include the agency costs involved in
ensuring the quality of the product. For example, imagine that some of the twenty
percent spent on administrative costs help the donor monitor whether eighty percent of each dollar donated is spent in Africa or not. In that case, a donor would not
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entrepreneur to reduce quality by decreasing administrative costs
(i.e., all eighty percent is provided to African children), then there is
no reason why the donor should object to the entrepreneur keeping
any savings she creates through cutting administrative costs. In other
words, Malani and Posner have created a hypothetical in which agency costs incurred in monitoring product quality with respect to administrative costs are zero. It is no wonder, then, that a for-profit
126
compensation structure would be preferable in this situation.
Thus, in Malani and Posner’s hypothetical, the non-distribution
constraint is necessary with respect to eighty percent of each donation, but a for-profit structure is more efficient for the other twenty
127
percent.
The ideal solution would be for the law to permit this
split. As discussed in Part IV, it does.
3.

What if “High Quality Product” Was Defined in a Way
that Did Not Replicate the Non-Distribution
Constraint?

While Malani and Posner’s choice of a percentage of money “going to” the charitable purpose replicates the non-distribution constraint, one could imagine an agreement between entrepreneur and
donor in which “high quality” is defined not by an amount of money
but by a quantum of benefit. This definition of “high quality” product
could also create a situation in which agency costs may be minimized
and the non-distribution constraint may be unnecessary or may result
in an inefficient transaction.
Of course, the “quantum” of benefit would have to increase with
each additional dollar contributed. This is necessary to ensure that
each dollar donated provides some marginal benefit to the children.
Presumably, it matters to the donor whether his contribution increases the benefit provided, and so he has an interest in monitoring not
be indifferent to cuts in administrative costs, unless they did not impact his ability to
monitor the quality of the product provided by the entrepreneur.
126
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the “formula”).
127
Even as described by Malani and Posner, the hypothetical may well be objectionable to donors because it is only a good bargain for the donor if administrative
costs reasonably increase in proportion to the amount of money provided for program costs. This is possible, but it is more likely that some administrative costs are
fixed. In other words, the first fixed amount of money is needed to get lights turned
on in an office (and other related expenses) and no money can be provided to African children until basic fixed costs are paid for. Then, after fixed costs are covered,
administrative costs presumably decline. If that is true, then an entrepreneur’s gamble that she can decrease administrative costs is really a bet that she can raise more
money than is predicted and thereby enrich herself because the marginal costs of
administration decline.
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just the overall benefit provided by the charity but the benefit provid128
ed by his contributions. It would not be sufficient to say that money is
being raised to provide clean water to one million African children;
rather, the entrepreneur would have to promise to provide a certain
129
quantum of water per dollar contributed.
Thus under the hypothetical provided, in which the donor wishes to provide clean water to
African children, imagine that donors are seeking to provide clean
130
water to ten million African children.
Providers of aid other than
the entrepreneur are offering to build a water delivery system that
would benefit ten million Africans for ten million dollars (of which
$500,000 is fixed compensation for their CEO). The entrepreneur
believes that she can do it for eight million dollars plus her compensation. If the entrepreneur could provide the same amount of water
131
for a lower price, then the for-profit model might be preferred.
This hypothetical potentially does a better job of solving the incentive problem associated with the non-distribution constraint than
Malani and Posner’s hypothetical. In this case, the entrepreneur is
incentivized not only to cut administrative costs but also to find more
efficient ways of providing the identified benefit, which is, after all,
what donors want her to do. But agency costs associated with this
type of approach are also potentially higher. Because a quality prod128

This concern with the marginal benefit provided with each dollar contributed
could be called the “non-divisibility” problem that is generally an aspect of public
goods. See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 506 (stating that public goods are
likely to be provided only by nonprofits because “owing to the indivisible nature of
the service involved, the consumer generally has no simple means of observing
whether his or her contribution has increased the level of the service provided[,
r]ather, the consumer must take the producer’s word that the contribution will be
used to purchase more of the good, rather than simply going into someone’s pocket”).
129
Malani and Posner’s hypothetical, to its credit, did not completely ignore the
divisibility problem. Some commentators, like Dan Pallotta, argue that once enough
money is raised to meet the charity’s goals, the entrepreneur should be able to keep
whatever else she raised. See DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON
NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL 15 (2008). In that case, if the agreement
was structured as a for-profit, it would be perfectly permissible, intended even, for
the entrepreneur to put in her pocket every dollar contributed after she has provided the agreed-upon water to the one million children.
130
And, in fact, Malani and Posner’s initial hypothetical described a situation in
which the “outcome” that defined a high-quality product was the provision of a “water filtration system,” not the expenditure of a certain percentage of funds raised. See
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019.
131
Remember, this would only be the case if the cost-savings would not be produced but for the strong incentive created by the entrepreneur’s profit-sharing compensation. If she discovered and implemented those savings without strong financial
incentives to do so, then donors would still prefer the nonprofit form.
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uct is defined with respect to an actual quantified outcome, that outcome must be monitored and that may involve agency costs that are
not apparent at first blush.
First, the hypothetical assumes that a competitor who has offered to provide water to ten million Africans for ten million dollars
has been identified. That solves the first agency-cost issue, which is
how the donor gets adequate pricing information about the reasonably predicted cost of providing water to ten million Africans. Without
a sufficiently robust market for the provision of water—and a market
that has identified the good provided with some comparable quantifiable outcome—there can be no adequate pricing information to
enable the donor to identify a “good deal” with sufficient precision.
Presumably, the only place to get this kind of information is
from the market of altruism providers. So, for example, the donor
needs to have some knowledge of the price per child of clean water as
provided by competitors in the market. In order to know how much
“profit” the entrepreneur should be permitted to take, donors need
to know what a good “price” is for the outcome they seek. In the hypothetical, they know that the “ordinary” cost is ten million dollars.
But knowing the “ordinary” cost is dependent on identifying the outcome with some precision. It is only once an outcome is identified
with precision that a market (in this case, the market for altruism)
can provide information about the ordinary cost of such an outcome.
In the regular market for consumer goods, we can only know how
much we are willing to pay for a Honda Civic once we know the price
of a Toyota Corolla. We do not care how much profit Toyota or
Honda are making from our purchase of their cars because we know
how much comparatively those cars are worth. When we are talking
about the market for altruism, that type of pricing information is
much harder to come by. The difficulty in obtaining that information is arguably an agency cost. Unless other providers of health
quantified their services in a reasonably comparable manner, this information is likely to be unavailable to the retail-level donor.
Only after adequate pricing information is available do we reach
the classic monitoring problem: the donor would need to verify that
the high-quality product was indeed provided—that ten million children got water on account of the donor’s contribution. The costs of
monitoring also include the costs associated with entering into an adequately defined agreement in the first place and of enforcing that
agreement if no high-quality product was provided.
Finally, the donor would need to address the so-called “nondivisibility” problem. He would need to be able to make sure both
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that water was provided in exchange for his contribution (and not for
others’) and that the pricing information he obtained was relevant to
his size of contribution and not just to overall costs. In order to do
that, the donor would need relatively robust information about all
the other sources of revenue available to the entrepreneur and what
terms were provided to those alternative sources.
Under the hypothetical, the entrepreneur thinks she can provide the water for eight million dollars, plus her compensation, while
the closest competitor can only provide it for ten million dollars, including compensation. In such an extreme case, perhaps all of the
agency costs combined might not equal the huge savings the entrepreneur is offering and so the for-profit model may be preferred.
But it is much more likely that the agency costs involved would exceed the savings made possible by financial incentives for the entrepreneur to cut costs. For example, the two million dollar savings that
the entrepreneur thinks she can achieve were created, after all, by a
huge informational asymmetry. The donors think that the water can
be provided for ten million dollars, including reasonable salary for
the manager. The entrepreneur thinks that it can be provided for
much less than that. And remember, the donors are not using their
own personal expertise to price the provision of water. They have a
presumably relatively robust market of other entrepreneurs and existing aid organizations seeking their altruism dollars to compare to the
entrepreneur’s offer. In other words, the donors and every other competing provider of altruism in the market think that water can only be provided to the African children for ten million dollars. But the entrepreneur thinks that she knows better. If the entrepreneur is wrong
and does not achieve her projected savings of two million dollars,
then the agency costs incurred by the donors may well exceed the actual efficiency gains provided by the entrepreneur’s genius. A choice
of the for-profit firm is a gamble that the entrepreneur will be able to
find such efficiency gains. And it is also a gamble that financial incentives will produce these efficiency gains when no other incentives
could. If the cost of identifying, verifying, and enforcing compliance,
and all the other agency costs identified is higher than the predicted
efficiency gains, then a nonprofit firm would be preferred, even if the
entrepreneur is completely self-interested.
The nonprofit form, on the other hand, potentially mitigates all
of these concerns. Once the profit motive is taken away from the entrepreneur, then she still may provide a low-quality service, but at
least she will not use the savings from providing a low-quality service
to enrich herself. If her expertise can permit her to provide highquality services—and save two million dollars in the process—then
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she may be able to find some incentive to do so even if her salary in
that year is not directly dependent on the profits earned by the firm.
Once the strong incentive of profit is removed from the equation, the
risk of uncertainty in monitoring product quality may decrease because the incentive to shirk has been significantly diminished.
4.

Donors Want to Enlist Entrepreneurs’ Help in Figuring
Out How to Measure Benefit to Charitable
Beneficiaries

In addition to all agency costs discussed above, the most important agency cost related to many providers of charitable services
may be the cost of quantifying benefit when the actual benefit sought
could be misidentified. Charities rarely define their activities in ways
that can easily be quantified in dollar terms. For example, CARE
(Hansmann’s example), describes its activities as follows: “CARE tackles underlying causes of poverty so that people can become self132
sufficient.” While there are charities that merely distribute food to
the hungry or medicine to the sick, charities like CARE seek to provide infrastructure development, capacity-building, micro-credit, or
other assistance that is designed, or at least described, as providing
the possibility to “tackle[] underlying causes of poverty” rather than
133
just alleviate suffering. Any charity that attempts to define its purpose in functional terms will have trouble defining a sufficiently precise agreement with donors as to some identifiable quantum of benefit to be provided.
Furthermore, even if a sufficiently precise agreement could be
reached, efficiency may be lost from the precision of the agreement
itself. This type of agreement would be inherently inflexible (if it
could be enforced). If, for example, the best way to provide clean
water were to change from well-digging to rainwater harvesting or the
best way to provide health were to change from the provision of water
to the provision of immunizations, then amending the agreement
may be expensive. This inflexibility is an agency cost.
In fact, one of the things a donor is often seeking in the expertise of the entrepreneur is advice about the best method to eradicate
poverty, for example. He does not just want the entrepreneur to be
skilled at reducing administering funds so that a substantial portion
“goes” to the ultimate recipient. Nor does he want the entrepreneur
merely to provide a quantity of water cheaply. Rather, he wants the
132

What We Do, CARE, http://www.care.org/careswork/whatwedo/index.asp (last
visited Apr. 25, 2012).
133
Id.
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entrepreneur to devise some means to leverage his donation and actually reduce poverty. He wants substantive expertise. Quantifying
the benefit to the poor children in terms of dollars that “go” to them
does a poor job of measuring benefit. Even quantifying the benefit as
a certain number of children receiving clean water does a poor job of
measuring benefit. Good charities use the money they collect in innovative ways that—at least donors hope—will have a bigger benefit
than merely sending dollars to the beneficiaries or providing easily
quantified goods to them. The cost of permitting the entrepreneur
to innovate and of structuring the transaction to encourage that innovation without overly incentivizing shirking on quality is also arguably an agency cost.
In other words, one could imagine situations in which the definition of a high-quality output is even more difficult to identify or
measure than in either of the hypotheticals. While it may be imaginable how one would count cost effectively that are dollars going directly to the beneficiaries, or count number of children benefitted, it
is much harder to make such an evaluation when the donor wants to
provide flexibility to enable the entrepreneur to use the money in the
most beneficial way. If there are changing circumstances, it may be
preferable to leave the entrepreneur some flexibility to react to
changing circumstances. In the charitable context, the outcome is
often very hard to quantify, and so agency costs are often prohibitively high. In these situations, the “non-divisibility” problem really
comes to the fore. If a donor wants to get guidance from the entrepreneur about the best use of funds or if he wants to leave the entrepreneur the flexibility to change uses to address changing circumstances, imagining an agreement that specifies which benefits were
derived from which dollars donated is even more daunting. It becomes very clear why a donor under these circumstances would want
a general solution to all these problems, such as the one provided by
the non-distribution constraint, even understanding that there might
be substantial efficiency losses caused by the removal of financial incentives for the entrepreneur to institute cost-saving mechanisms.
C. Conclusion of Part II
The above analysis suggests that under the most common circumstances, it is extremely unlikely that donors will choose to meet
their altruism needs in a transaction with a for-profit organization.
The agency costs associated with identifying a measurable output that
can solve the problems associated with the non-divisible tendencies of
altruism, as well as the more traditionally recognized costs of moni-
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toring and enforcing compliance with the agreement once it is
formed, are likely to overwhelm any efficiency gains that could be obtained through providing the entrepreneur with a profits-based com134
pensation structure. But this observation still does not explain why
the government should deny tax benefits to a donor who identifies a
situation in which he believes that efficiency gains from a profitsbased compensation structure would be greater than losses from in135
creased transaction costs.
I have not yet explained why the government should deny a tax deduction to a donor who wishes to donate
to a for-profit organization when that donor thinks such an organization can provide altruism to him in the most economically efficient
manner.
The following two Parts of this Article seek to provide an explanation for why at least the tax benefit of deductible contributions
should be reserved for donations to organizations bound by the nondistribution constraint. Part III seeks to explain why the government’s own agency-cost analysis counsels in favor of providing tax
benefits only to firms that accept a single standard version of the nondistribution constraint and to deny it to those firms that have no nondistribution constraint or insist on crafting their own non-distribution
constraint through private contracts. Part IV seeks to explain that
contrary to Malani and Posner’s assumption, current nonprofit law
actually permits incentive-based compensation to nonprofit employees in any situation in which some measurable metric of success can
be identified (other than pure “net profits”). Thus, the problem
identified by Malani and Posner is not nearly as significant as they
suggest.

134

Oliver Hart’s work on public versus private ownership of public services supports the point made in this Article he argues that private ownership encourages
cost-saving innovation but that it also encourages “quality-shading” innovation. Hart,
supra note 113, at C71 “The choice between public and private ownership depends
on which of these effects is more important.” Id.
135
As Hansmann notes,
A more fundamental problem with such a theory, however, is that it is
not obvious why a subsidy is needed to encourage nonprofits even
where their development seems appropriate as a response to contract
failure. Why can consumers not be trusted to select nonprofit rather
than proprietary producers on their own in those situations in which
nonprofits are to be expected to offer more reliable service?
Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 18, at 70.
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III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST:
A MODEL WITH THREE ACTORS
But why should the government reserve tax benefits exclusively
to nonprofit charities? In fact, it appears that donors and entrepreneurs should be able to figure out that the nonprofit form is the best
structure for their donative charities without any “nudge” from the
government. The agency theory can be used not only to understand
the motivations of donors and entrepreneurs in a transaction for
charitable goods, but also to understand the motivations of the government itself. At least one reason why contributions to nonprofit
charitable organizations are tax deductible, while contributions to
for-profit charities are not, is because the government’s own agencycost analysis counsels in favor of the non-distribution constraint
whenever the government seeks to provide tax subsidies for charitable goods.
In order to evaluate the choices the government should rationally make in providing tax benefits to charities, I initially assume that
the government wants to provide some sort of charitable goods. That
is, the government has determined that there is a reason to provide
certain charitable goods. Justifications for providing tax benefits to
136
providers of charitable goods are legion. One widely accepted economic justification for providing tax benefits to providers of public
goods is that because of the free-riding problem, these goods will be
undersupplied by regular market mechanisms. Because third-party
goods arguably are “non-divisible” (which is a close correlate of the
quality of “non-exclusivity”), they too will be undersupplied by regular market mechanisms. A government subsidy increases the likeli137
hood that such services will be provided at socially optimal levels.
This justification for the government providing charitable goods is
well accepted, but—as Malani and Posner point out—it does not provide a justification for the government to provide public goods
138
through nonprofit firms as opposed to for-profit firms.
My goal is
to assess whether the government is rational to restrict the provision
of tax benefits to nonprofit organizations—those organizations
bound by the non-distribution constraint.

136
For an excellent overview of “measurement” and “subsidy” theories, see Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 514–27 (2010). She argues that the justification is not
complete until distributive justice concerns are more fully integrated. Id. at 528–53.
137
See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 47.
138
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2011.
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Once it is assumed that the government wants to provide charitable goods, the government’s methods for doing so can be assessed.
This Article derived a “formula” for determining when a donor would
choose the nonprofit form. The formulation was as follows: the nonprofit form will be chosen whenever the cost of monitoring and enforcing a specific level of product quality exceeds the gains that are expected to accrue from
providing the entrepreneur with strong incentives to implement cost-saving ef139
ficiencies.
In other words, if the so-called agency costs are high
enough to make the donor fear that permitting the entrepreneur to
take a profit interest in the transaction would result in shirking on
quality, the donor is rational to seek to impose a non-distribution
constraint.
If it is correct that the donor would be prudent to engage in
some sort of agency-cost analysis before making a donation to a charitable entity that compensated its entrepreneur with the “profits” from
the firm, it also seems prudent for the government to engage in a
similar type of agency-cost analysis before providing public goods.
This seems like an obvious observation, but it appears to have been
140
rarely appreciated.
If the justification for the government providing tax benefits is that it seeks to subsidize the provision of a certain
type of goods, the government is not just a regulator of the market
but a participant in the market for those goods. It seeks to provide
resources to further the production or acquisition of those identified
goods. As a market participant in the provision of charitable goods,
the government presumably has the same agency-cost concerns as do
private participants in the market for such goods. Just like donors to
charitable organizations, the government needs to assess how it can
139

See supra text accompanying note 73.
Henry Hansmann recognized in passing that the government is, in effect, a
market participant when it provides tax benefits to charitable organizations. See
Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16, at 605 (“To be sure, federal tax law does effectively make the government a patron of many nonprofits, and to this extent the government has an interest in policing the behavior of nonprofits that is much like that
of any other patron. . . . For the limited group that both qualify for the charitable
deduction and receive considerable donative support, the government is in effect a
substantial contributor.”); Henry Hansmann, What is the Appropriate Structure for Nonprofit Corporations Law? 22 (Yale Univ. Inst. for Soc. and Policy Studies Program on
Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper No. 100, 1985) (“[O]ne important reason that statutes providing subsidies and special preferences require that the recipient organizations be nonprofit is presumably that these statutes are providing donations of a sort
to these organizations, and seek the fiduciary restraints of the nonprofit form for the
same reasons of contract failure as do other Donors.”) Subsequently, Atkinson has
made this point. Atkinson, supra note 70, at 516 n.55 (citing Hansmann, Role, supra
note 16, at 847); see also Estelle James, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 397, 408 (1987).
140
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obtain charitable goods most efficiently, given that the people who
actually provide them—the government’s “agents” in the transac141
tion—may be motivated by financial incentives.
A. The Government’s Provision of Public Goods
If public goods and third-party goods create problems for donors, they presumably create similar problems for the government.
Namely, the cost of monitoring the quality of the output of providers
of third-party goods may be prohibitively high for the government.
Even more problematic may be the “non-divisibility” problem. That
is, the government may also have difficulty making sure that a provider of a public good does not just “re-sell” the very same goods to other donors after the government has made its contribution.
Of course, the government has many tools to avoid these problems. First, it could review each transaction to determine whether
there is a measurable output that can be identified with a high-quality
product. If the government can identify such a measure of quality
and it is relatively inexpensive to bind the entrepreneur to providing
a high-quality product, then the government may consider permitting
the entrepreneur to assume the financial risk and benefit from
providing that product efficiently. That is, if the government can
cost-effectively identify and enforce a high-quality product require142
ment, then it may choose to structure its transaction as a for-profit.
The government does this all the time when it provides public goods
through contracts with for-profit firms, as Malani and Posner recog143
nize.
But note that the government will not contract with a forprofit firm for the provision of public goods if it cannot identify a
measurable output and bind the firm to the provision of high-quality
144
goods in a relatively cost-effective way.
Hansmann’s “contract fail141
The implication of this observation is that charities are the “agents” not only of
their donors, who assume the role of principal by virtue of their “altruistic” donations, but also of the government, which assumes the role of principal by virtue of its
tax subsidies for “charitable” activities.
142
Remember, if the government cannot identify a high-quality product so that it
can bind the entrepreneur to providing that quality of product before calculating
her profit, then structuring the transaction as a for-profit is inefficient. The Entrepreneur (assuming she is not altruistic) will simply shirk on quality in order to capture increased profits and will have a lessened incentive to provide the product efficiently.
143
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2051 (“[T]he government can purchase public goods through ordinary procedures for government procurement, which include
competitive bidding.”).
144
The government’s choice between providing services itself or through a forprofit partner is addressed in the economic literature on privatization. As Hart,
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ure” can afflict contracts with the government as well as contracts
with individual market participants.
What can the government do if “contract failure” prevents it
from contracting effectively with for-profit providers of public goods?
Most obviously, it can provide the services itself, using its own em145
ployees. These employees are usually compensated with “fixed” salaries, and so the use of such employees to provide public goods replicates the “non-distribution constraint” as a solution to the agency-cost
146
problem. Collecting tax revenue is perhaps an apt example of why
the government may choose to use its own employees rather than a
for-profit firm to provide a public good. A “high-quality good” for
the purposes of tax collection is collecting the taxes that are owed
under the law. This is an inherently difficult thing for the government to measure ex ante, and thus to construct a contract that would
effectively define the proper collection would be prohibitively expensive. It is presumably easy to attempt to maximize tax revenue by aggressively pursuing non-meritorious claims, but this approach would
not be in the government’s interest. The government has determined that the potential efficiency gains to be derived from providing financial incentives to those actually enforcing the tax laws are
less than the costs of effectively monitoring whether they are providing a high quality product or whether they are enriching themselves
by shirking on quality.
B. The Government’s Provision of Public Goods Through Tax Benefits
Thus, when the government seeks to provide charitable goods, it
should perform some sort of agency-cost analysis to decide if it should
provide those goods through a “for-profit” or a “nonprofit” mechaShleifer, and Vishny point out, “[T]he fundamental difference between private and
public ownership concerns the allocation of residual control rights . . . .” Oliver
Hart, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an
Application to Prisons, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1127, 1129 (1997). They conclude that “the private contractor’s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong since he
ignores the adverse impact on quality.” Id. They also argue that “providing an agent
with strong incentives to pursue one objective, such as profits, can lead to his shirking on other objectives, such as quality.” Id. at 1131.
145
Rob Atkinson has recently pointed out that defenders of nonprofit charity often imply that government provision of charitable goods is somehow inherently less
efficient than nonprofit provision of those same goods. See Atkinson, supra note 15,
at 249. I do not mean to imply that. Rather, each compensation structure has its
own efficiencies and inefficiencies that apply differently in different situations.
146
There are also mechanisms available to the government that occupy an analytic category between contracting with a for-profit firm and providing the services itself, such as cost-plus contracting and providing incentive pay to government employees.
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nism. If it chooses a nonprofit form, then it can provide the goods
“itself” by using its own employees or it can provide them indirectly
through a nonprofit partner. But the question that I seek to answer
here is not whether the government should always provide charitable
goods through nonprofit firms, but whether the government should
require the non-distribution constraint when it seeks to provide charitable goods through tax benefits. The theory of “dual contract failure” seeks to explain why it is beneficial for the government to provide at least some charitable goods through tax benefits, instead of
147
directly.
The agency theory provides another justification for the
government providing charitable goods through tax benefits instead
of directly, specifically by justifying reserving the deduction of charitable contributions for contributions to nonprofit firms.
Generally, theorists have justified the government’s provision of
public goods through tax subsidies for nonprofit providers by arguing
148
that the government cannot supply optimally some public goods.
They posit that because the government cannot correct optimally the
“market failure” that accompanies some public goods, the production
of these public goods is beset by “government failure” as well. Specifically, “the government will be unable to overcome a market failure
when demand for a given public good is heterogeneous, and the
149
amount each voter demands varies.” A subsidy for the provision of
such goods through the charitable sector thus serves the interests of
correcting those market failures that the government is unlikely to
correct directly and therefore promotes diversity in charitable objec150
tives.
The agency theory provides another justification for the government providing charitable goods through a deduction for charitable contributions. As discussed above, when the government provides charitable goods directly, it must evaluate each transaction
individually and perform a case-by-case analysis of the agency costs
involved in ensuring a high-quality product. It would have to review
each transaction to determine whether the charitable outcome is eas147

See generally Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in
a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN
STRUCTURE AND POLICY, supra note 16, at 21(arguing that nonprofits arise to provide
public goods that neither the private market nor the government sector would otherwise provide); BURTON WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988)(same).
148
See generally Weisbrod, supra note 147; WEISBROD, supra note 147.
149
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93
MINN. L. REV. 165, 186 (2008).
150
See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 404–09 (1998). For
an important recent refinement of this theory, see Benshalom, supra note 59.
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ily measurable and to craft a means of enforcing the provision of a
high-quality product in each case. But the costs involved in investigating each transaction are agency costs. In cases in which the government does evaluate each transaction individually, it can make decisions about whether to fund an activity through a for-profit partner,
whether to fund an organization through a nonprofit partner, or
whether to perform the activity itself. While the government could
provide its subsidy through tax benefits after conducting a case-bycase analysis of a transaction, this case-by-case evaluation will presumably be very costly.
It is the very nature of tax benefits that they be provided to a relatively broad class of recipients. The laws that define who may benefit and when are written ex ante and structure an indefinite number
of individual transactions. The government need not evaluate each
transaction individually to determine how it could best minimize
agency costs and maximize the efficient provision of the charitable
goods it seeks. Given the large number of transactions that tax benefits may apply to, how would the government best structure those
benefits to maximize the chance that they are used to provide beneficial goods or services and minimize the agency costs associated with
providing such services? Structuring the government’s role in the
provision of charitable goods inherently reduces agency costs in151
volved in providing such goods.
Even more important than the savings that come from the government avoiding a case-by-case evaluation of how to provide charitable goods, is the government’s benefit from the donors’ participation
in the transaction when it structures the provision of charitable good
as a tax deduction. When the government structures its subsidy as a
tax deduction, it only provides the subsidy to organizations that taxpayers have identified as worthy of the deduction. Furthermore,
providing the subsidy in the form of a deduction forces taxpayers to
vote with their wallet, so to speak, by only giving the subsidy to those
organizations to which taxpayers make voluntary contributions and in
152
relative proportion to the dollars contributed. This choice of structure for the subsidy allows the government to leverage the choices of
millions of taxpayers and to use those taxpayers’ choices of worthy
causes and organizations to make its own decisions about which caus151

Brian Galle argues that a regime that requires “explicit government judgments
about the value of a charity’s output . . . is precisely what the law of charities, as currently constructed, is designed to prevent.” Galle, supra note 15, at 1228.
152
This argument does not apply only to a subsidy in the form of a tax deduction,
but also to a tax credit or governmental matching grant.
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153

es and organizations to support. If we could exclude egoistic purposes in an expenditure, then the expenditures that donors make
would reflect their judgment about “worthy” charitable causes and in154
stitutions.
These choices are aggregated in a market mechanism
155
when donors make contributions to charities.
As David Schizer has recently pointed out, when the government
provides subsidies for the provision of public goods through a tax
deduction, it not only enlists the assistance of taxpayers in choosing
causes or providers but it also “recruit[s] private donors to monitor
the quality of nonprofits, so that the government can piggyback on
156
these quality-control efforts.” It is beyond the scope of this Article
to discuss this insight in depth since to do so would involve an analysis of the tools the government could use to identify “trustworthy”
donors and those that should not be trusted, which Schizer only be153
The government traditionally restricts the types of organizations that can receive tax-deductible contributions, although there is a case to be made that it should
provide the subsidy to any organization to which taxpayers make true contributions.
See, e.g., Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 18, at 88 (“Indeed, the wisest course is
probably just to assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that all nonprofits that receive a substantial fraction of their income in the form of donations are operating in
an environment of contract failure, and therefore merit the exemption on efficiency
grounds.”); see also JOHN D. COLUMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX
EXEMPTION 193 (1995).
154
The non-distribution constraint serves to maximize the chances that the services are socially beneficial by leveraging the financial choices of donors. Above, I discussed the somewhat elusive question of what exactly donors are trying to do when
they donate money to charities. I suggested that at least some of what they are doing
is purchasing a benefit for someone other than themselves. I called this otherdirected benefit “altruism” even though I conceded that some portion of the altruism they purchase is probably related to the “good feelings” (warm glow) they get
from donating. Millions of citizen-donors make choices every year about where to
donate their money. If the government could isolate those donations that are in effect purchases of altruism, then they would be gathering a tremendous amount of
information about organizations and activities that donors believe improve the
world.
155
Obviously, not all donations are purchases of altruism. Some may be masked
payments for private goods or services. The non-distribution constraint is at least
one mechanism the government can use to identify the transactions that are purchases of altruism. When the donor cannot benefit financially from the transaction,
then the government can rule out financial motivations from the transaction and can
make a somewhat more educated guess that altruism motivates the transaction.
Thus, we exclude quid pro quo transactions from the definition of “contributions”
worthy of the tax deduction. The non-distribution constraint has a role in ensuring
that a donor’s contribution is “altruistic” by limiting the types of financial returns he
can make from giving money to the charity. As discussed supra note 84, this Article
focuses on the non-distribution constraint’s effect on providers of labor, not capital,
and thus a full discussion of the importance of the non-distribution constraint’s effect on donors and other providers of capital is saved for a later time.
156
Schizer, supra note 15, at 224.
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157

gan to sketch out. But it is enough here to identify the fact that the
government’s choice of a tax deduction as at least one method for
providing a subsidy for charitable goods has the potential to be the
most efficient means of providing such goods because of the agency
costs saved in leveraging (rather than pointlessly replicating) taxpayer effort.
The ability to leverage taxpayers’ choices of cause and organization and the taxpayers’ monitoring efforts have immense agency-cost
implications for the government. As discussed above, the government could (and does) individually evaluate many possible public
and third-party goods and provides the ones that it determines to be
socially optimal either through its own employees or through contracts with for-profit providers. This process, however, has costs—
agency costs. Finding a mechanism to enlist taxpayer assistance and
to piggyback on taxpayer efforts in these processes has the potential
to save the government substantial costs. Of course, this strategy can
only be effective if taxpayer choice of organizations worthy of charitable contributions generally identifies organizations that actually deserve a government subsidy.
C. So, Why Not Permit Tax-Deductible Contributions to For-Profit
Charities? The Theory of Imperfect Consumers
If the government is so keen on leveraging taxpayers’ decisionmaking, then why not permit the taxpayer to make the decision
whether to contribute to a nonprofit or a for-profit charity? If agency
theory predicts that consumers will select either the nonprofit form
or the for-profit form when the respective form is most efficient, then
Malani and Posner rightly ask why not just trust consumers to choose
the right form to provide charitable goods and subsidize the provision of those goods whether they are provided through a nonprofit
or for-profit form? Just because the agency theory predicts that the
nonprofit form will almost always be the most efficient way to structure the provision of third-party and public goods is no good reason
in itself to condition tax benefits on nonprofit status. Why not give
the same benefits to for-profit providers of such services if donors want
to donate money to them?
One possibility is that the answer has something to do with tax158
payer knowledge. That is, to explain the choice of subsidizing only
157

See supra note 84.
The answer may also have to do with taxpayers’ interests, of course. If the taxpayers’ interests diverge from those of the government, then the government cannot
trust the taxpayers’ choices when it seeks to provide subsidies for charitable goods. A
158
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transactions subject to the non-distribution constraint, we need a
theory that explains why taxpayers are good at choosing worthy causes and providers, but potentially not always as good at deciding
whether those providers should be nonprofit or for-profit. Remember, consumers are almost always likely to choose a nonprofit provid159
er for charitable goods.
What I am looking for is an explanation
why, in the rare cases that taxpayers choose a for-profit provider instead, the government may be suspicious of that choice and may decide to refuse to provide tax benefits to the for-profit provider. The
agency-cost theory is exactly that.
Malani and Posner briefly describe one possible explanation why
the government would choose to restrict tax deductions to nonprofit
charities: consumers might choose for-profit providers of charitable
goods because they are confused or deceived, and thus it would be illadvised for the government to rely on their choice of transaction
structure when making its own decision to whom to provide its subsi160
dy.
The government does not want to provide tax benefits to forprofit providers of such goods if the only reason donors might choose
them is because of confusion, ignorance, or fraud. Malani and Pos161
ner call this the “Theory of Imperfect Consumers.”
Malani and Posner do an excellent job of describing the problem concisely:
Because the tax break is keyed to the Donor’s personal allocation
to charities, it effectively delegates power over government expenditure to the Donor. For the same reason that the Donor
[may be] a poor decisionmaker for her own allocations, she is a
poor agent to control the government’s expenditures. This is why
the tax breaks must be restricted to firms that cannot distribute
profits. It is a way to protect the government from imperfect Do162
nors.

Malani and Posner’s primary solution to the problem of “imperfect
consumers” is to argue that if consumers are imperfect, then there
163
should be no tax deductions for charitable contributions.
If the
government thinks that it is appropriate to subsidize the provision of
certain goods, like public goods or third-party goods, then it should

treatment of this “theory of diverging interests” is beyond the scope of the present
discussion.
159
See supra text accompanying note 63.
160
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2050.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 2051.
163
Id.
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164

choose its own recipients and pay them directly. Malani and Posner
state, “[T]he government can purchase public goods through ordinary procedures for government procurement, which include com165
petitive bidding.”
As discussed above, Malani and Posner’s suggestion risks losing a
tremendous quantity of potential efficiency gains if taxpayer choices
have any value. If the government went through its own process of
choosing public goods and providers, it would lose the value of leveraging taxpayer choices. It would also lose the ability to save its own
agency costs by piggybacking on the monitoring ability of a large and
diverse market for charitable goods.
Malani and Posner acknowledge that there is a value in the government providing some avenue other than the political process for
citizens to choose priorities of government spending on public
166
goods. In response, they suggest an alternative plan: if the government wants to provide some direct input from citizens about what to
fund, they should let citizens choose (for example on their tax returns) a type of activity that should be funded; then “the government
would accumulate these dollars [allocated by citizens] and choose an
167
organization to receive such dollars.” The government could then
subsidize an organization of its own choice that conducts the activity
168
In this proposal, the government mainchosen by the taxpayers.
tains the benefits of taxpayer choice of activity but gives up the benefits of leveraging taxpayer choice of organization, as well as the benefit
of donor monitoring discussed by Schizer. Furthermore, by simply
voting to allocate federal dollars, the taxpayer is less invested in her
choices. It is plausible to conclude that a taxpayer pays more attention even to the choice of activity when she is contributing her own
money to support it than when she simply makes a preference known
on a piece of paper sent to the government. This proposal, then,
while slightly better than just repealing the deduction for charitable
contributions, still risks losing the potential value of leveraging a
164
Id. at 2052. Malani and Posner also cover their bases by arguing that “imperfect consumers” are not a problem because consumer-protection laws can protect
them against fraud. Id. at 2051. Of course, fraud is only one reason why consumers
are imperfect, and anti-fraud laws provide limited protection even against fraud.
165
Id.
166
Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2030 (explaining that the “public goods theory” justifies the government providing a tax subsidy for the provision of charitable
goods, and stating that “we will assume that it is correct for the purposes of our argument”).
167
Id. at 2051.
168
Id.
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market of taxpayer choices of providers and taxpayers’ monitoring of
quality.
Neither proposal is necessary, however, if taxpayer ignorance
does not apply equally to all choices taxpayers must make in choosing
a charity. Taxpayers may be quite adept at choosing the types of
charitable goods that are worthy of support and even the organizations that should be supported, but sometimes, they are poor choosers whether to compensate the entrepreneurs who provide such charitable goods with a “profits” interest. Remember, taxpayers have to
be good enough only at choosing activities and organizations that
make their aggregated choices better and cheaper than those made
by the government. Thus, Malani and Posner’s response to the possibility of taxpayers’ ignorance is an overreaction if taxpayers’ ignorance is related specifically to the choice of the non-distribution constraint and is not more inclusive.
Why might we assume that the small number of consumers who
choose the for-profit form to provide charitable goods do so because
they are ignorant, confused, or deceived? First, the nonprofit form is
so prevalent for providers of charitable goods that donors might assume that any provider of charitable goods is bound by the nondistribution constraint. People are genuinely confused by the distinction between “nonprofit” organizations and providers of charity.
They assume that they are the same thing. Therefore, consumers
who choose for-profit providers of charity may think those providers
169
are constrained like nonprofits when in fact they are not.
But even more importantly, the whole point of the nondistribution constraint is that the donor’s agency costs are minimized
if he largely delegates the monitoring and enforcement of the constraint to the
government. In other words, contract failure means that consumers
cannot do what they ordinarily do in a transaction—monitor the
quality of the goods provided. In response to this contract failure
they substitute something that can be monitored—compensation to
the entrepreneur—and hope that because the entrepreneur cannot
personally use the excess value, the excess value will be used to provide charitable goods. They retain some ability to monitor the nondistribution constraint (for example, by looking at the entrepreneur’s
compensation on the charity’s Forms 990), but they mainly delegate

169

For example, people asked to contribute to organizations in traditionally charitable areas, like education, may assume that those organizations are nonprofits, or
are somehow constrained by something like the non-distribution constraint, even
when they are not.

LEFF_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 11:05 AM

AGAINST FOR-PROFIT CHARITY

865

170

that responsibility to the government. The government then monitors and enforces the non-distribution constraint with respect to the
charity’s management. Agency costs are reduced sufficiently thereby
that a market for charitable goods is possible.
If donors depend on the government to monitor the nondistribution constraint, then it makes perfect sense that they may
sometimes be confused about it. The donors rely on the government
to prevent the entrepreneur from pocketing their contributions
when, in fact, there may be nothing in their agreement with the entrepreneur preventing such result. Thus, it is entirely reasonable for
the government to reach the conclusion that the non-distribution
constraint is necessary to the efficient provision of public and thirdparty goods. The donor is implicitly depending on it. It is also entirely reasonable for the government to maintain this conclusion even
in the rare case in which a donor wants to provide charitable goods
through a for-profit organization. That donor may well be confused
about the effect of removing the non-distribution constraint in that
case. This confusion does not call into question the value of the donors’ (the market’s) choices about what charitable goods are worth
funding and what organizations are the best providers of them. It is
limited to an unusual choice about something that the structure of
the transaction generally requires the consumer to delegate to the
government.
Therefore, in the usual case in which no compelling measure of
quality can be identified in a cost-effective way, the government
should insist on providing a tax deduction for contributions only to
nonprofit charities, even if some confused donors would prefer to
contribute to for-profit charities.
D. What About Malani and Posner’s Hypothetical?
In Part II, I discussed the fact that Malani and Posner’s example
of a “for-profit” charity was one in which the entrepreneur had identified a plausible definition of a high-quality charitable good for the
donor. In that hypothetical, the entrepreneur had promised the donor that eighty percent of all contributions would “go to” poor Afri171
can children. Assuming that it is possible, at least conceptually, for
“go to” to have a meaning, the eighty percent promise constitutes a
170

As Schizer points out, their monitoring may still be robust under certain circumstances. Schizer, supra note 15, at 258.
171

For previous discussion of this hypothetical, see supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text.
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meaningful definition of a high-quality good. Malani and Posner
then posited that the remaining twenty percent of every contribution
would be split between “administrative costs” and compensation for
172
the entrepreneur.
They argued that permitting the entrepreneur
to keep whatever money she saves from providing administrative services relating to the charity more cheaply than was predicted would
173
promote efficiency. That would incentivize her to find the most efficient way to provide those services. Assuming that “administrative
costs” are such that there is no way for the entrepreneur to enrich
herself by shirking on the quality of those services, this claim is plausible. If the government prevented that kind of arrangement, then it
seems that it might be doing us all a disservice by preventing an efficiency-enhancing structure from being adopted.
In the next Part of the Article, I survey the current law relating
to compensation of charity managers and find that what Malani and
Posner call a “for-profit” compensation structure is actually perfectly
compatible with the nonprofit form under current law. But before
moving on, it is worth pointing out that the government’s own agency-cost analysis may rationally require that the government prevent
what might, in some specific circumstance, be the most efficient
structure for a transaction. That is because if the government is to
reduce agency-costs in the provision of charitable goods, it has to
make rules that are generally applicable to whole classes of transactions,
and it needs to be able to enforce the same rules to a very large number of transactions. The main agency cost that the government seeks
to save when it provides a subsidy for the provision of charitable
goods in the form of a tax deduction is the cost involved in evaluating
each transaction, customizing a contract to govern that particular
transaction, and enforcing multiple different contractual terms. For
the non-distribution constraint to work, the government needs to
identify something it can observe (compensation to charity employees, for example), it needs to make rules about which types of compensation are permissible and which are not, and it needs to enforce
those rules. The health of the nonprofit sector depends on the government being able to do that well and cheaply. Thus, if a particular
compensation structure generally reduces efficiency, the government
may choose to prevent organizations from using it even if it may enhances efficiency in certain specific circumstances.

172
173

Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2027.
Id.
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For example, Malani and Posner point out that a for-profit firm
“can promise Donors, by contract, that it will not distribute profits to
174
They argue that these private contracts
its managers or workers.”
could be “part of the sales contract for that product,” and that the entrepreneur could “hire an auditor” to ensure that the for-profit chari175
ty is abiding by the terms of the contract. Since for-profit firms can
replicate the non-distribution constraint through private contracts of
various sorts, Malani and Posner ask why they should not be permitted the same tax benefits as nonprofit firms that constrain themselves
through the non-distribution constraint provided under the Internal
176
Revenue Code.
The problem with allowing tax-deductible contributions to forprofit firms that engage in these types of private contractual substitutes for the non-distribution constraint is simply that these constraints are private contracts. From the government’s perspective, it is
reasonable ’to provide governmental subsidy only to transactions
177
that, in effect, use its own standardized contractual terms.
If the
government needs to monitor and enforce the terms of the agreement, then of course it wants those terms to be standard. The law of
tax-exempt organizations is the set of standardized terms under
which the government provides subsidies to providers of charitable
goods. The non-distribution constraint is the heart of that set of
standardized contracts, and the government is rational in its choice
to value generality, administrability, simplicity, and enforceability as
parts of its own agency-cost analysis when deciding which transactions
178
to subsidize.

174

Id. at 2035.
Malani and Posner also suggest that the for-profit firm could institute a “costplus pricing system” by “billing the donor after all costs have been tallied and the
product has been delivered.” Id. at 2036. This cost-plus system would presumably
also be defined in a private contract and enforced through regular contract law.
176
Id. at 2060. For a response, see generally Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 16,
at 516–18.
177
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 85 (2d ed. 1977) (stating
that a seller might employ a standard or form contract when “he wishes to avoid the
costs involved in negotiating and drafting a separate agreement with each purchaser
[since] [t]hese costs are likely to be very high for a large organization that engages in
so many transactions that it must adopt routine procedures for the guidance of its
line personnel”).
178
After recognizing that private parties could create private contractual forms of
the non-distribution constraint, Hansmann notes that “[t]he advantage of the nonprofit form, then, is that it economizes on contracting and enforcement.”
Hansmann, Role, supra note 16, at 853. This Article points out that it economizes on
enforcement not only for the donors, but also for the government, even though the
175
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Malani and Posner’s example of the organization that promises
to cause eighty percent of the funds to “go to” the African children is
a case in point. Even though this “hybrid” model—in which the nondistribution constraint is confined to one part of the agreement—
may be more efficient than a strictly nonprofit model under certain
specific circumstances, it would be rational for the government to refuse to provide a tax deduction for contributions to such a structure.
That is because the government might conclude that the agency costs
saved by enforcing a single standard non-distribution constraint outweigh those efficiency gains potentially available from permitting organizations to isolate administrative costs by customizing a private
non-distribution constraint.
Thus, the coupling of the nondistribution constraint with tax benefits for donative charities is justified by the government’s need to reduce agency costs by providing a
standard set of rules about permissible compensation.
The next Part of this Article surveys current law and finds that it
permits nonprofits to use the hybrid structure described by Malani
and Posner. In other words, entrepreneurs may customize many possible incentive compensation structures while still permitting their
donors to receive a deduction for their contributions. The entrepreneurs are only prohibited from tying compensation directly to profits.
That is, they can receive the precise incentives that Malani and Posner think would add efficiency to the provision of charitable goods.
But entrepreneurs must do so in a way that does not egregiously
permit the providers of charitable goods from profiting by shirking
on quality—the exact concern the non-distribution constraint is designed to address.
IV. COMPENSATION AND THE NON-DISTRIBUTION CONSTRAINT UNDER
CURRENT LAW
I noted previously that any transaction that solves the nondivisibility problem associated with the provision of public and thirdparty goods identifies a measurable output to which compensation
can be tied. Malani and Posner’s hypothetical does this in a way that
expressly mimics the non-distribution constraint by setting a fixed
percentage of all donations that must be used for charitable purposes
and permitting the entrepreneur to keep any of the remaining money she does not spend on “administrative costs.” But I suggested other possibilities, like agreements in which an organization would provide a set quantum of clean water for African villagers for each dollar
government assumes the enforcement role when the standardized non-distribution
constraint known as “nonprofit law” is adopted.
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contributed. This structure also identifies a measurable output that
defines a quality good and makes it possible to structure a transaction
in such a way that the entrepreneur would keep any money left over
after the set quantity of water is provided to the agreed-upon number
of African villagers.
Malani and Posner argue that the compensation in their hypothetical would not be permitted to a nonprofit firm under nonprofit
179
law, and by extension, it would be easy to assume that the compensation described in the second example would also not be permitted.
In their conclusion, Malani and Posner make a compromise proposal: “[I]f one is uncomfortable with giving for-profits access to
nonprofits’ tax breaks, a compromise may be to allow nonprofits to
180
access for-profits’ incentives.” They argue that the IRS should “relax the restriction” on nonprofit managers’ compensation that does
not allow nonprofit managers to “receive incentive pay keyed to the
profits, to the revenues, or perhaps even to the costs of operating the
181
organization.”
In fact, however, while the Internal Revenue Code probably restricts compensation tied directly to the profits or revenues of a nonprofit firm, output-specific variable compensation structures are both
theoretically consistent with the non-distribution constraint and permitted under current law for nonprofit managers. In other words,
the incentive compensation structure described in the Malani-Posner
hypothetical and in my extension of it is permitted under current law.
Structures based on true profits are not permitted. This distinction
under current law makes perfect sense as an expression of the agency-cost analysis of the government’s provision of tax benefits for charities.
In this Part, I discuss briefly the ways in which current law does
not conform to the simple distinction between for-profit and nonprofit
organizations described by Malani and Posner. This is important because if current law permits the kind of efficiency-enhancing compensation structures that Malani and Posner associate only with forprofit firms, then the argument in favor of reforming the law to expand the tax-subsidies provided to for-profit firms is even less persua182
sive. It is also important because the agency-cost analysis presented
179

See Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019 (“Unfortunately, under current law,
the Entrepreneur cannot establish her charity as a nonprofit organization.”).
180
Id. at 2065.
181
Id.
182
It is also true that tax-deductible contributions can be provided to true forprofit firms providing charitable goods as long as some charitable intermediary is
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in this Article provides a principled method for determining which
incentive-pay structures should be permitted to charitable organizations. Good pay structures are those in which managers’ pay is tied to
some measurable output so that managers’ compensation cannot be
increased by reducing the quality of the charitable good provided. If a
manager can increase her compensation by reducing the quality of
the good provided—as is the case when compensation is tied directly
to profits or revenues—agency costs will simply be too high when the
product is largely invisible to the donors and the government. Thus,
to the degree to which current law draws the line between compensation tied to measurable output and compensation tied to profits, it
draws the line in the correct place. Even more importantly, to the extent that there is ambiguity in the law—and there is plenty—this
agency-cost method should provide a guide for decisions about what
compensation structures to permit. This method can be used by donors, by charity boards of directors, by the IRS in administering the
law, and by critics or reformers of current law.
Malani and Posner argue that nonprofit organizations must pay
their managers fixed salaries, and only for-profit firms are permitted
183
to pay their managers profits-based compensation.
This bilateral
distinction does not adequately model reality, however. In fact, it is
used. This is easily accomplished. A nonprofit charity that meets the requirements
of §§ 501(c)(3) and 170 is created, and it accepts tax-deductible contributions. It
then takes the money contributed and contracts with a for-profit provider for the
charitable goods. There is nothing impermissible about a charitable nonprofit organization providing charitable goods by contracting with a for-profit supplier. So,
for example, an organization whose purpose is to provide water to African children
could contract with for-profit partners who will build the wells or do the actual supplying. These contracts would presumably be only subject to the “private benefit”
restrictions, and thus it would be the obligation of the charity’s board to ensure that
it used reasonable diligence in determining that its contract is a fair one and that
charitable assets are not wasted. Thus, while it is true that retail-level individual donors may not make tax-deductible donations to for-profit firms, tax-exempt organizations (both private foundations and the so-called public charities) are permitted to
funnel the money raised through tax-deductible contributions to for-profit firms
providing charitable services. Malani and Posner briefly address a structure similar
to this possibility under the rubric of “sophisticated legal manipulation” that could
permit tax benefits for contributions to for-profit firms. Id. at 2056. They argue that
this solution is not sufficient because it does not permit the manager of the nonprofit
to be compensated with a profits interest in the for-profit firm. Id. at 2057. While
this is plausible as a matter of law, it is not clear why it is a compelling objection. The
managers or directors of the nonprofit act as monitors and guarantors of the charitable interests of the donors and others, but they are not the people whose purpose
or expertise is to find efficiency gains in delivering those goods. That is the job of
the manager of the for-profit, who can be compensated with a profits interest in the
for-profit firm.
183
Id. at 2024.
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more useful to describe the entrepreneur’s possible compensation
options under current law as a pole with “fixed” salary on one end
and “profits” on the other end. In the middle is a range of compensation options that may be called “incentive pay.” A “fixed” salary
means that the entrepreneur gets paid the same amount no matter
what she does—her salary is presumably fixed at the beginning of her
relationship with the donors, so neither she nor they know yet what
types of cost-saving mechanisms she may find or invent. A “profitbased” salary means that her pay varies based only on the difference
between the total amount of money the firm takes in (presumably
from donations in the case of donative nonprofits) and the total
amount spent on health for African children and any other administrative costs of providing that health (this difference is called “prof184
its”).
But “incentive pay” means anything between these two extremes. Thus, between the “fixed” compensation structure and the
“profits-based” compensation structure are various “incentive” compensation structures that tie compensation to identifiable outcomes
other than profits.
The tax law governing permissible compensation for organizations that receive tax-deductible contributions can be confusing, partially because the law is different depending on whether the compen185
sated individual is a “disqualified person” or not.
But, generally,
even if the entrepreneur is a disqualified person, she may pay herself
a variable salary based on some quantifiable factor other than net
186
profits.
If certain procedural safeguards are implemented, the

185

Generally, a “disqualified person” with respect to a public charity is “any person who was . . . in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the
organization.” 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f) (2006).
186
Generally, punitive excise taxes may be levied against organizations that engage in an “excess benefit transaction,” which is defined as “any transaction in which
an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization . . . to or
for the use of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided
exceeds the value of the consideration . . . received for providing such benefit.” §
4958(c)(1)(A). In other words, excessive compensation may result in excise taxes, but
reasonable compensation will not. Reasonable compensation is defined as “the
amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises . . . under
like circumstances.” Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2012). If a compensation
structure is defined as “fixed” for the purposes of the regulations, then the relevant
time for determining reasonableness is the date the parties enter into the contract.
Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(2)(i). But a “fixed” compensation structure does not mean one in
which the total amount of compensation is negotiated in advance. Rather, “fixed
payment means an amount of cash or other property specified in a contract, or determined by a fixed formula specified in the contract, which is to be paid or transferred in exchange for the provision of the specified services.” Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii)(A) (em-
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charity may even rely on a rebuttable presumption that the compensation paid to the entrepreneur is reasonable even if the compensation varies based on some measurable output and even if the entre187
preneur is a “disqualified person.” Commentators have also noted
that incentive compensation arrangements are permissible, so long as
188
variable pay is tied to some metric of performance.
189
For example, take Malani and Posner’s hypothetical. The donors and the entrepreneur agreed that the donors would pay one
hundred dollars, of which eighty would go directly to the benefit of
the African children. If the entrepreneur can figure out how to rephasis added). The “fixed formula” may relate to future contingencies, “provided
that no person exercises discretion when calculating the amount of a payment or deciding whether to make a payment (such as a bonus).” Id. Thus, a compensation
structure in which the entrepreneur is paid a variable amount based on some quantifiable factor would be a “fixed” compensation structure and would be permitted so
long as the amount that was expected to be paid was “reasonable” at the time the
contract was entered into. For example, in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-01030 (Jan. 6,
2006), the IRS found that a certain incentive compensation arrangement in which
compensation was tied to meeting specific performance objectives did not constitute
inurement. See also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39674 (Jun. 17, 1987); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 38905 (Jun. 11, 1982); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38283 (Feb. 15, 1980).
But see People of God Cmty. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127, 133 (1980) (holding that
a “percentage-of-gross-tithes” method of fixing compensation constituted private inurement); Gemological Inst. of Am. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1604, 1609 (1952)
(holding that compensation measured as a percentage of “net earnings” constituted
private inurement).
187
Generally, a rebuttable presumption in favor of reasonableness is created if (1)
the compensation arrangement is “approved in advance by an authorized body . . .
composed entirely of individuals who do not have a conflict of interest,” (2) “the authorized body obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability” of the
compensation arrangement, and (3) “the authorized body adequately documented
the basis for its determination concurrently with making that determination.” Treas.
Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2011). Of these, the only difficult requirement is that the organization obtain “appropriate data as to comparability” to support a compensation
arrangement in which payments vary based on some measure of output. But so long
as other organizations (nonprofit or for-profit) are paying their management in this
way, it is permissible for a nonprofit charity to pay in this way.
188
See, e.g., Peter Frumkin, Nonprofit Compensation and the Market, 21 U. HAW. L.
REV. 425, 434 (1999) (“[I]f compensation fluctuates, the organization should be able
to attribute the fluctuation’s relationship to the employee’s performance.”); Sandra
B. Richtermeyer & Gary Fleischman, Planning Strategies to Avoid Intermediate Sanctions,
36 TAX ADVISER 424, 431 (2005) (“The use of incentive compensation is becoming
more popular, particularly as nonprofit organizations compete with the private sector for executive talent. It is critical to link incentive or bonus pay to specified identifiable goods (such as organizational performance), particularly for highly paid executive directors or officers.”). See generally Brody, supra note 16, at 494 (“[T]he law
generally permits competitive returns to labor; the non-distribution constraint bars
only returns to equity capital.”).
189
For previous discussion of this hypothetical, see supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
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duce the indirect administrative costs of providing water without reducing the money used directly in Africa, then she can keep one
190
hundred percent of the savings in administrative costs.
Malani and
Posner posit that a compensation structure in which the entrepreneur can keep any of the remaining twenty dollars not spent on administrative costs would not be permissible for a nonprofit organiza191
tion.
But actually, under current law, an incentive-pay structure
that identified some reasonable amount of administrative costs and
permitted the entrepreneur to keep any savings in administrative
192
costs as their own compensation would likely be permitted.
This compensation structure would not be a per se violation of
the non-distribution constraint. Rather, it would have to be evaluated
to determine whether it is reasonable compensation for the entrepreneur’s services. This analysis would presumably begin with the
“rebuttable presumption” provided under Section 53.4958 of the
Treasury Regulations, in which an independent committee of the
board would make a determination of the compensation structure,
document it, and gather evidence that the overall structure is compa193
rable to compensation arrangements made elsewhere.
Then, as
long as the compensation structure is reasonable overall, the fact that
it is tied to some objective measure of success, such as reducing administrative costs above what was previously expected, would not in
any way be problematic for a nonprofit charity.
The binary opposition proposed by Malani and Posner is misleading, and the situation described in their own hypothetical, once
fleshed out, is equally available under current law to for-profit and
nonprofit charities. What distinguishes this permissible incentive-pay
structure from an impermissible profits interest? Nothing more than
the fact that the firm has identified a measure of success—an outcome that is
not tied to net profits of the firm. That measure of success is the reduction in administrative costs associated with the particular project.
190
Presumably, they would also agree that her compensation would be reduced by
any cost she incurs over the predicted administrative costs.
191
See Malani & Posner, supra note 8, at 2019. In this regard, Malani and Posner’s
claim that the IRS will not permit nonprofit managers to receive compensation tied
to the costs of operating an organization appears to be just wrong. See id. at 2065
(“[T]he IRS does not permit managers who exercise control over a nonprofit to receive incentive pay keyed to . . . perhaps even to the costs of operating the organization.”). They provide no authority to support the claim, and it appears to be inconsistent with current law.
192
As discussed supra note 112, it is unlikely the donors would permit the entrepreneur to keep 100% of the efficiency gains. She would likely have to split some
portion of the gains with the donors in some way.
193
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4 (2002).
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Malani and Posner’s hypothetical replicated the non-distribution
constraint under private contract terms, so it is not surprising that it
is permissible under current law. But what if the organization identified a measurable output as a definition of a quality product and
compensated a CEO who managed to outperform the predicted cost
of providing quality products? In this case as well, current law permits incentive-pay structures for organizational managers. Imagine
that the organization promised that for each one hundred collected,
water would be provided to one hundred additional African children
and that it had solved the “non-divisibility” problem in some way so it
was easy and cost-effective to verify that each additional dollar contributed would provide water for an additional unique African child.
Imagine that the organization decided to provide incentive compensation to its CEO and agreed that if the CEO could provide water for
the same number of African children at less than one dollar per
child, then she could keep the savings.
Again, in this case, current law would probably permit the proposed incentive-compensation arrangement. Again, the analysis
would begin with the “rebuttable presumption,” under which an independent committee of the board would gather evidence that the
overall structure is comparable to compensation arrangements made
elsewhere, make a compensation contract prior to paying compensa194
tion, and document everything. Then, as long as the presumption
is not rebutted, the compensation would not be problematic. Again,
the fact that compensation is tied to meeting some performance
goals, like providing water to a certain number of additional children
per dollar spent, would be entirely acceptable under nonprofit law.
Then, in at least these cases, the permissible “incentive” pay
structure provides all the benefits of the “profit” pay structure proposed by Malani and Posner. But these are not pure “for-profit”
compensation structures. In neither case can the entrepreneur keep
any money not spent on providing water to African children. Instead,
in both cases some measurable output is identified, and the entrepreneur can only keep money left over after providing charitable
goods of a quality that can be measured.
195
As discussed above, this is an unusual situation in the provision
196
of charitable goods. More often, the provision of charitable goods
194

See id.
See supra Part II.B.4.
196
The fact that incentive-pay structures are not more widely used by charities,
despite the fact that they are permissible under current law, supports the observation
that the ability to measure success in observable ways is unusual. As discussed supra
195
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will be accompanied by more pervasive contract failure. That is, the
costs associated with identifying and monitoring the provision of
measurable high-quality goods will overwhelm any potential savings
to be derived from such incentive-pay arrangements.
As discussed above, if the entrepreneur’s pay was not tied to
some measurable outcome—like savings in administrative costs—but
instead was tied to net profits alone, the entrepreneur could simply
provide less benefit and keep the money. If she found that she could
provide water to one hundred percent of the children in the village
for ninety dollars (keeping her predicted ten dollar fee) or that she
could provide water to only fifty percent of the children for seventy
dollars (bumping her compensation to a healthy thirty dollars), then
there would be nothing in the for-profit structure that would prevent
her from doing so. In other words, if a “high quality product” cannot
be defined, or if effective means of monitoring and enforcing the
quality of the product cannot be implemented, then the profits-pay
structure will usually be unattractive to the donor.
Malani and Posner create a hypothetical to illustrate why a profits-based structure may sometimes be preferable to a nonprofit structure, but in so doing, they create a structure that is permissible for
nonprofits under current law. An actual for-profits structure, one in
which the entrepreneur really has access to the net profits of the
firm, unconstrained by some mechanism to restrict her compensation
to some measurable output, would result in an obviously unacceptable cost—the unprotected risk of the entrepreneur profiting from
providing a low-quality product. The fact that incentive-pay structures are consistent with the non-distribution constraint under current law suggests that there are unlikely to be many situations in
which a donor accurately identifies a situation in which the most efficient transaction structure is a for-profits model. In this case, if a donor chose the for-profit structure, the government would be reasonable to deny a tax deduction for such a contribution.
But more importantly, this line between incentive-pay structures,
in which compensation is tied to some identifiable output measure,
and profits-based pay structures, in which compensation is tied to the
difference between revenue and costs, not only describes the line
drawn by current law but it also provides a principled method of asPart II.B.3, donors generally do not have good information about the best means to
improve the health of African children or what the competing costs and benefits may
be. They do not know the types of cost savings that the entrepreneur may institute
because they do not know what the reasonable costs for providing the services they
seek would be. Instead, they rely on a fixed salary and the non-distribution constraint to secure the most efficient transaction structure.
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certaining what compensation structures should be permitted in charitable organizations. Thus, the IRS could expand its guidance on
managerial compensation building on the insights presented here.
The key is whether a compensation scheme enables managerial compensation to be increased when the managers reduce quality. Those
compensation structures that are most likely to permit such enrichment by quality reduction, like a pure profits interest, should be prohibited since they do not advance the government’s interest in the efficient use of its tax subsidies for charitable goods. The agency-cost
focus also highlights the importance of the government identifying
those persons who share its interest in high-quality charitable goods.
Charity managers who stand to increase their compensation by reduc197
ing product quality do not share the government’s interest.
V. CONCLUSION
If the current law is generally adequate in the way it deals with
the non-distribution constraint and its effect on manager compensation, then what justifies this Article? What is it about the claim that
“tax breaks” for charitable goods should be “decoupled” from the
non-distribution constraint that demands such an extensive reply?
The primary answer is that Malani and Posner’s attempted “refutation” of the so-called agency theory provides a timely opportunity to
expand that theory and to investigate its application to decisions
about how to compensate the managers of the providers of public
and third-party goods. In short, the conclusion of the first part of this
Article is that donors to charitable goods’ providers are probably
choosing the most efficient mechanism to deliver such goods when
they choose to provide them through nonprofit organizations, despite any efficiency costs of providing them in such form.
But the implications of the agency theory are wider than simply
justifying the donors’ choice of providing charitable goods through
nonprofit providers in most circumstances. Rather, this Article also
proposes some criteria for evaluating incentive-pay arrangements by
charities, nonprofit or otherwise. The agency-cost analysis described
in this Article should provide a useful guide to anyone making decisions about whether incentive compensation arrangements are effi-

197
As I have pointed out elsewhere, this attention to the government’s agency
costs may justify the IRS’s interest in whether a charity has an “independent” governing board or other “independent” stakeholders. See Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal
Regulation of Nonprofit Board Independence: Focus on Independent Stakeholders as a “Middle
Way,” 99 KY. L.J. 731 (2011).
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ciency promoting or inefficient. If a performance measure can be
identified and monitored at a sufficiently low cost, then tying manager compensation to that measure may be efficiency enhancing. That
is, efficiency may be enhanced so long as the manager cannot enrich
herself by shirking on quality of product. When the product is altruism or has an altruistic or public-good aspect, then the quality of the
product is likely to be expensive to monitor or measure, and thus
managers may well have an opportunity to cut costs by reducing quality. Performance measures that enable them to enrich themselves by
cutting costs at the expense of quality are likely to be inefficient. A
pure profits interest in a firm, in which compensation is tied directly
to the difference between revenue and costs, enables managers to increase their compensation by cutting costs in ways that directly impact product quality. That is why true for-profit charities are inefficient.
But Malani and Posner’s argument about tax benefits also provides the opportunity to enlarge the agency theory to explain why
donors who are tempted to choose to provide such goods through
for-profit providers should be denied tax benefits for that choice.
The government has its own agency costs to worry about, and it is reasonable for the government to provide a single standard that will
most often maximize the efficiency of providing charitable goods
through tax benefits. This is especially true because there are plausible explanations why the government might be suspicious of donors
seeking tax benefits for the provision of charitable goods through forprofit firms. The goal of the tax law of charitable organizations, then,
should be to provide a standard set of rules that constrain the compensation of the managers of charitable firms that maximize the efficiency of the government’s provision of charitable goods through tax
incentives. The current state of the law, which permits incentive
compensation arrangements so long as they are tied to some metric
(some output measure) other than profits or revenues, conforms well
to the intuitions formed by thinking through what the agency theory
predicts. In addition, to the degree to which the standard under current law will be further clarified and developed, agency theory suggests that the key factor in deciding whether incentive-pay structures
are efficiency enhancing is whether product quality can be identified
and monitored in a cost-efficient way by someone whose interest lies
in maximizing product quality. If it cannot, then managers may be
incentivized to reduce quality. It is in the government’s interest to
prevent those types of incentive-pay arrangements.
Finally, I mentioned in the introduction that the nondistribution constraint affects the way both providers of labor and
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providers of capital are compensated. This Article has focused on
justifying the non-distribution constraint’s limitation of compensation for providers of labor. But an adequate treatment of whether
the non-distribution constraint’s limitation on providers of capital is
justified under an agency cost analysis is still to be performed. The
reasoning of this Article suggests that providers of capital must be
denied a true profits interest in charitable firms receiving tax benefits
if they have any control rights over the operation or management of
the firm. If “ownership” and “control” could be separated in a truly
fundamental way, then it is possible that providers of capital could be
compensated with the profits of a firm without risking excessive losses
from shirking on quality. It is unlikely that people would want to
provide capital under these circumstances, again because of agency
costs, but a full-scale exploration of this possibility is warranted.

